



T-TIP NEGOTIATIONS ROUND TWO: AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO REDIRECT THE TRAJECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
NICHOLAS WIGGINS† 
Over !,"## international investment agreements govern trillions of dollars in 
foreign direct investment that crisscrosses the globe. Nonetheless, the international 
investment law regime formed by those agreements faces a legitimacy crisis. Critics 
argue that international investment treaties’ dispute-resolution mechanisms favor 
foreign investors and that their substantive obligations undermine countries’ 
sovereignty. As the world’s largest exporters and recipients of foreign direct investment, 
the European Union and United States hold the keys to reform. Until now, however, 
they have differed on solutions. A well-designed investment chapter in a free trade 
agreement between the European Union and United States could simultaneously 
resolve those differences and redirect the trajectory of international investment law. 
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“[W]hen borders are crossed, arbitration o,ers the crucially important 
advantage of forum neutrality—parties can appear before a neutral decision 
maker without having to be hauled into the other’s courts.” 
— U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Stephen Breyer1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the operation of more than ",$&&2 international investment 
agreements (IIAs),3 most of which include an investor-state-dispute 
settlement (ISDS)4 mechanism allowing investors to allege host-state5 
breaches of the IIAs, international investment law sits at a crossroads. The 
crescendo of opposition to ISDS has built to a fever pitch over the past several 
 
1 STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD !#&-#! ("&!'). 
2 This figure was calculated by adding the total number of bilateral investment treaties in force to the 
total number of treaties with investment provisions in force. See International Investment Agreements Navigator, 
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements [https://perma.cc/Y$YU-K(DC]. 
3 Treaties that provide reciprocal investment protection to investors include (!) bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), see Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties [https://perma.cc/NW)F-%#*%], and (") free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters, see Free Trade Agreements, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements [https://perma.cc/H"NY-
)D"J]. In accordance with literature on international investment law, this Comment usually refers to these 
agreements as IIAs, except when referring to BITs or FTAs makes sense in context. 
4 For a discussion of IIAs containing ISDS mechanisms that the European Union has been 
party to, see infra Section I.B., and for a discussion of IIAs containing ISDS mechanisms that the 
United States has been party to, see infra Section I.C. Although ISDS technically refers to the 
speci+c arbitration procedure that investors can access to challenge state breaches of substantive 
investment protections covered in an IIA, procedural and substantive provisions of IIAs are widely 
referred to under the same rubric of ISDS in contemporary debate and scholarship. Thus, this 
Comment uses the ISDS acronym to refer to both procedural and substantive provisions of IIAs, 
unless otherwise speci+ed. It uses the phrase “ISDS mechanism” when referring speci+cally to the 
particular dispute settlement procedure under which investors may sue states. According to United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Investment Policy Hub, ",((* of the 
",')) treaties it has mapped contain ISDS mechanisms. See Mapping of IIA Content, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE 
AND & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-
mapping [https://perma.cc/KEQ*-N(GX]. 
5 As in other areas of international law, in international investment law, the term “state” is used 
to refer to the term “country.” For example, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States describes countries that are signatories to 
the Convention as “Contracting States.” See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States pmbl., Mar. !#, !$%', !) U.S.T. !")!, !")" [hereinafter 
ICSID Convention]. This Comment therefore primarily uses the term “state,” but, where 
appropriate, uses “country” as a synonym. The term “host state” refers to the country in which a foreign 
investor invests. The term “home state” refers to the state of which the foreign investor is a national. 
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years—especially as developed countries have concluded more IIAs with each 
other and have increasingly found themselves defending against ISDS claims.6 
Critics of ISDS register various procedural and substantive grievances. 
On procedure, they argue that ISDS lacks transparency, democratic 
accountability, and a mechanism to correct erroneous arbitral decisions. On 
substance, they contend that ISDS infringes states’ right to regulate, includes 
vague investment protection standards that are interpreted inconsistently, 
and gives foreign investors advantages over domestic investors. 
In light of this legitimacy crisis, an investment chapter in a free trade 
agreement (FTA) between the United States and European Union—which 
would cover roughly -).$ trillion in cumulative transatlantic foreign direct 
investment (FDI)7—would provide a vehicle to redirect the trajectory of 
international investment law and deepen the E.U.-U.S. economic relationship. 
Such an FTA would revive the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (T-TIP), a comprehensive FTA that the European Union and 
United States began negotiating in "&!% but then paused in "&!', partly 
because of di,erences over ISDS.8 Speci.cally, the United States balked at 
the European Union’s proposed inclusion of an Investment Court System in 
the FTA’s investment chapter.9 Attempts to revive T-TIP negotiations have 
sputtered, as the two sides have sparred over discrete trade issues and have 
prioritized the conclusion of FTAs with other trading partners.10 
 
6 See infra notes (*–'" and accompanying text (discussing disputes in which countries like 
Canada, the United States, and Germany found themselves as respondent parties); infra note !(" 
and accompanying text (explaining that the United States began responding to ISDS disputes after 
the North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force). 
7 SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF!&$*&, U.S.-EU TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT TIES: MAGNITUDE AND SCOPE !-" ("&"&). This +gure excludes the bilateral 
investment relationship between the United States and United Kingdom. 
8 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF!&!"&, 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP) ! ("&!)) (“Sticking points 
[between the European Union and United States] remain in other hotly contested areas, such as 
geographical indications (GIs), digital trade, and investor protections.”); The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip 
[https://perma.cc/#BK#-W#B*] (“The TTIP negotiations were launched in "&!* and ended without 
conclusion at the end of "&!%.”). 
9 Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of EU Proposal for Investment Court in Trade 
Pact, REUTERS, (Oct. "$, "&!', *:&! PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-ttip-
idUSKCN&SN"LH"&!'!&"$ [https://perma.cc/EE#Y-UQUR] (“The United States is wary of a 
European Union proposal for a new court system to settle investment disputes as part of the world’s 
biggest free-trade agreement, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said.”). 
10 In particular, the European Union and United States have struggled to resolve longstanding 
World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes involving subsidies supplied by the European Union and 
United States to Airbus and Boeing, respectively. See generally Bryce Baschuk, Why the Boeing vs. Airbus 
Fight Is Coming to a Head, WASH. POST (Oct. !, "&"&), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-the-
boeing-vs-airbus-fight-is-coming-to-a-head/"&"!/&!/&%/d'*ec'ca-'&"d-!!eb-a!f'-fdaf"#cfca$&_story.html 
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Nonetheless, given the size of the E.U. and U.S. economies and the volume 
of their bilateral trade and investment, both sides have signaled their interest 
in eventually resuming full-/edged FTA negotiations.11 And as of this 
Comment’s publication, the European Union and the Biden Administration have 
signaled their commitment to intensifying E.U.-U.S. economic cooperation.12 
Despite the opportunity presented by an investment chapter in an E.U.-
U.S. FTA, the path toward its conclusion is unclear, as the European Union 
and United States have adopted di,ering approaches to remedying their 
perceived shortcomings of the current international investment law regime. 
Since "&!$, the European Union has insisted on including an E.U.-developed 
Investment Court System—instead of traditional, ad hoc investor-state 
arbitration—in all its IIAs.13 The Investment Court System model re/ects 
the European Union’s view that having ISDS claims heard under a structure 
that resembles a domestic court—including an appeals mechanism—will 
enhance international investment law’s legitimacy. Over the past several 
years, the European Union has included the Investment Court System in IIAs 
negotiated with Canada, Singapore, and Vietnam.14 Ultimately, the European 
Union envisions the treaty-by-treaty Investment Court System structures 
merging into a Multilateral Investment Court. 
 
[https://perma.cc/#HT)-JPZ)] (explaining the longstanding WTO dispute between the European 
Union and United States about the subsidies they have provided to Airbus and Boeing, respectively). 
11 For example, the United States and the European Union concluded a small trade deal in 
August "&"& that provided U.S. lobster exports with better market access to the European Union, 
in exchange for better market access for certain E.U. exports to the United States. See Joint Statement 
of the United States and the European Union on a Tari! Agreement, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. "!, "&"&), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-o,ces/press-o,ce/press-
releases/"&"&/august/joint-statement-united-states-and-european-union-tari--agreement 
[https://perma.cc/G'UU-T)RL] (noting that the trade agreement arose out of congressional and 
presidential directives to negotiate a trade agreement with the European Union). 
12 See, e.g., A New EU-US Agenda for Global Change, at !, JOIN ("&"&) "" final (Dec. ", "&"&) (explaining 
that given the size and volume of the E.U.-U.S. economic relationship, the European Union and United States 
should set “a new transatlantic agenda for global cooperation” (emphasis omitted)); Press Release, Off. of the 
U.S. Trade Representative, Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Virtual Meeting with European 
Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager (Mar. "$, "&"!), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/"&"!/march/readout-ambassador-katherine-tais-virtual-meeting-european-
commission-executive-vice-president-& [https://perma.cc/RUU"-GRUB] (“[U.S. Ambassador Katherine] 
Tai outlined her strong desire to develop a more positive and productive trade relationship with 
the European Union.”). 
13 The development of the E.U. position on ISDS in IIAs is discussed at length in infra Section I.B. 
14 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Can.-European Union § F, Oct. 
*&, "&!%, "&!) O.J. (L !!) "* [hereinafter CETA]; Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the 
Conclusion of the Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and Its Member States, of 
the One Part, and the Republic of Singapore of the Other Part § A, COM ("&!#) !$( +nal (Apr. !#, "&!#); 
Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Investment Protection Agreement 
between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
of the Other Part § B, COM ("&!#) %$* +nal (Oct. !), "&!#). 
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Conversely, the United States has responded to criticisms of ISDS by 
removing the ISDS mechanism between the United States and Canada, and 
narrowing its application between the United States and Mexico in the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).15 Although various 
U.S. presidents and Congresses have contemplated an appellate mechanism 
for ISDS disputes,16 the United States has never taken concrete steps toward 
establishing such a mechanism in any of its IIAs. 
Against this challenging backdrop, this Comment provides a pragmatic 
roadmap for how the United States and European Union can reconcile their 
positions on international investment law and negotiate an IIA that will 
provide a model on which future IIAs can be built. First, it claims that the 
combination of ad hoc arbitration with an appellate mechanism embedded in 
the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) would remedy many of the procedural challenges that international 
investment law faces. Second, it argues that an E.U.-U.S. IIA could resolve 
lingering uncertainty in international investment law about the scope and 
content of substantive investment protections. 
The Comment proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the history of ISDS, 
its foreign policy and economic rationales, and the nature of the legitimacy 
crisis it faces. It then explains the E.U. experience with ISDS and examines 
how the European Union’s political and legal institutions have developed the 
European Union’s current position on ISDS. In turn, Part I addresses the 
U.S. experience with ISDS and U.S. responses to criticism of ISDS—
especially in light of the recently concluded USMCA and the U.S. critiques 
of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body. 
Part II advances the proposed structure of an investment chapter in an 
FTA between the European Union and United States. Speci.cally, it focuses 
on how an ISDS mechanism with traditional, ad hoc arbitration in the .rst 
instance, coupled with an appellate mechanism located within ICSID, would 
operate and resolve legitimacy concerns. Part II also explains how the 
proposed investment chapter would respond to perceived /aws in the 
substance of international investment law by clarifying the scope and content 
of core investment protection standards. Part III discusses the implications 
of this Comment’s proposed investment chapter structure, with an emphasis 
on institutional and strategic challenges that the proposal might introduce. 
 
15 The USMCA is the successor agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement. It 
entered into force on July !, "&"&. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, OFF. OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-
mexico-canada-agreement [https://perma.cc/F"SS-J)%%]. 
16 See infra notes !)!-)*, !)% and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. model bilateral 
investment treaties’ consideration of appellate mechanisms). 
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I. BACKGROUND: THE E.U. AND U.S. POSITIONS ON INVESTOR-
STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN CONTEXT 
This Part uses the historical development of ISDS to de.ne the 
boundaries within which the European Union and United States can 
negotiate a legitimacy-enhancing IIA. First, it examines the main rationales 
for ISDS and the nature of its legitimacy crisis. Second, it considers the 
European Union’s experience with ISDS, demonstrating how the European 
Union evolved into the global champion for an Investment Court System. 
Third, it analyzes the U.S. experience with ISDS and why the current U.S. 
position on ISDS must be understood in light of its denunciation of the 
WTO’s Appellate Body. 
A. International Investment Law at a Crossroads 
ISDS has long been used as a tool to advance states’ foreign policy and 
economic interests.17 Before examining the criticisms leveled against ISDS, it is 
necessary to explain the foreign policy and economic rationales that led to its 
development and that remain ongoing justifications for its use. 
From a foreign policy perspective, ISDS has been justi.ed as a way to 
guarantee that a home country’s investors receive certain core standards of 
legal protection when investing in another country, without needing the home 
country to intervene on its investors’ behalf when disputes arise.18 Indeed, a 
multilateral desire to end the aggressive intervention of developed states on 
behalf of their investors in the .rst half of the twentieth century—so-called 
gunboat diplomacy—motivated the development of the ISDS regime.19 
Home-state interference in investment disputes in the absence of IIAs has 
continued into the twenty-first century. For example, consider the U.S. 
Section %&! investigation into China’s measures related to the forced 
technology transfer of U.S. companies investing in China. Under Section %&! 
of the Trade Act of !#*), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) 
may investigate whether another country imposes an “unreasonable or 
 
17 See, e.g., SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R(*&'", 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS !) ("&!*) (“U.S. 
investment negotiations can help to advance U.S. trade, foreign policy, and development objectives.”). 
18 See, e.g., Joost Pauweyln, Rational Design or Accidental Evolution? The Emergence of 
International Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW !!-
(* (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauweyln & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., "&!() (describing the objective of 
removing home-state interference in foreign investment disputes as a fundamental driver in the 
development of the ISDS regime). 
19 See, e.g., id.; U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. (UNCITRAL), Possible Reform of Investor-
State Disputes Settlement (ISDS) ¶ ', U.N. Doc. A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!(" (Sept. !#, "&!)) 
[hereinafter U.N., Possible Reform] (“[T]he ISDS regime was intended to ‘de-politicize’ investment 
disputes and e-ectively remove the risk of such disputes escalating into inter-State con.icts.”). 
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discriminatory” measure that “burdens or restricts” U.S. foreign direct 
investment in that country, among other forms of commerce.20 Upon an 
affirmative finding, the United States may impose tariffs on that country’s 
exports to the United States.21 The United States relied on this authority to 
find that China’s forced technology transfer practices unreasonably burdened 
or restricted U.S. FDI in China,22 and then to impose tariffs on over -$&& 
billion of Chinese imports into the United States as a countermeasure.23 China 
has retaliated in kind.24 In short, the United States used the Section %&! 
investigation to intervene on behalf of its investors and politicize an 
investment dispute—the precise type of outcome ISDS was designed to avoid. 
An IIA between the United States and China might have avoided that 
outcome, because investor-state disputes initiated under that IIA would have 
involved the application of international law to which China had bound itself, 
and because the remedy for China’s breach of the treaty would have been 
damages paid to aggrieved U.S. investors,25 not tari,s on Chinese exports to 
the United States. Indeed, before USTR launched the Section %&! 
investigation, the United States and China were negotiating an IIA that 
might have allowed U.S. companies to bring ISDS claims against China26 for 
the same types of forced technology measures that grounded the Section %&! 
 
20 !$ U.S.C. § "(!!(b)(!), (d)(!)(B). 
21 Id. § "(!!(c)(!). 
22 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S 
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION *&! OF THE TRADE ACT OF !$)(, at (*-() ("&!#). 
23 China Section "#$—Tariff Actions and Exclusion Process, OFF, OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-*&!-investigations/tariff-actions 
[https://perma.cc/(PQD-SJZX]. 
24 See WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF!&)&#, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE 
LAWS: SECTION *&! AND CHINA, at ! ("&!$) (noting that China had increased tariffs on /!!& billion 
worth of U.S. imports). 
25 See, e.g., "&!" U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. *(.!, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%"&text%"&for%"&ACIEP%"&Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F(QE-FR"P] [hereinafter "&!" Model BIT] (“[A] tribunal may award, separately or in combination, 
only: (a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; and (b) restitution of property, in which case 
the award shall provide that the respondent may pay monetary damages and any applicable interest 
in lieu of restitution.”). In practice, investor-state arbitration tribunals almost invariably award 
damages, not restitution, for breaches of IIAs. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW "$*-$( ("d ed. "&!") (“In investment 
arbitration, the remedy nearly always consists of monetary compensation.”) 
26 LAUREN GLOUDEMAN & NARGIZA SALIDJANOVA, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REV. 
COMM’N, POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR NEGOTIATING A U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY "! ("&!%) (“The U.S.-China BIT will likely contain traditional ISDS 
mechanisms, enabling Chinese [state-owned enterprises] with investments in the United States to 
bring arbitration claims directly against the U.S. government . . . . U.S. entities with investments in 
China will likewise be able to bring arbitration claims directly against the Chinese government . . . .”). 
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retaliation.27 Unlike the Section %&! tari,s,28 such an IIA enjoyed widespread 
support from U.S. companies,29 and would not have caused collateral damage 
to U.S. companies importing from and exporting to China. 
From an economic perspective, the primary arguments favoring ISDS 
include reducing the risk of FDI and dissuading host states from imposing 
negative externalities on foreign investors.30 IIAs reduce the risks of FDI 
because they lower transaction costs, provide greater predictability in the 
substantive obligations host countries must honor, deter host governments 
from imposing arbitrary costs on foreign investors after the foreign investors 
have incurred substantial sunk costs, and establish an e,ective remedy—the 
ISDS mechanism—for addressing treaty breaches.31 This risk reduction, in 
turn, lowers the cost of capital associated with investing in the host country, 
thereby incentivizing FDI.32 IIAs reduce the risk that host states impose 
negative externalities on foreign investors because they discipline states 
against imposing rent-seeking measures on foreign investors—for example, 
forced technology transfer.33 Such substantive obligations, accompanied by 
the ISDS mechanism, therefore ensure that host states do not discriminate 
against foreign investors vis-à-vis domestic investors. 
Despite these foreign policy and economic arguments in its favor, ISDS has 
weathered a legitimacy crisis over the past decade.34 Some claim that IIAs 
 
27 Compare "&!" U.S. Model BIT, supra note "', art. #.!(f) (prohibiting parties to the treaty from 
requiring an investor “to transfer a particular technology, a production process, or other proprietary 
knowledge to a person in its territory” (emphasis added)), with OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, supra note "", at !$ (“China uses inbound foreign ownership restrictions, such as 
joint venture (JV) requirements and foreign equity limitations, and the administrative licensing and 
approvals process to require or pressure the transfer of technology.” (emphasis added)). 
28 See, e.g., Letter from Agric. Transp. Coal. et al. to Donald Trump, President of the U.S. ! (Mar. !#, 
"&!#), https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/##*ba('b-a&%a-(b"a-b%ab-'c#(c#a(a#%'.pdf [https://perma.cc/#GVV-
AFR)] (“The Administration should not respond to unfair Chinese practices and policies by imposing tariffs 
or other measures that will harm U.S. companies, workers, farmers, ranchers, consumers, and investors.”). 
29 Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Chairman, Paulson Inst. & John Frisbie, President, U.S.-
China Bus. Council, to Barack Obama, President of the U.S., & President Xi Jinping, President of China 
(Sept. !(, "&!'), https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/Sept%"&"&!'%"&CEO%"&BIT%"&letter%
"&to%"&Presidents%"&Obama%"&and%"&Xi%"&%"#ENG%"&%"B%"&CHI%"$.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G''(-UQTF] (“We are pleased to submit to you a letter from the heads of $( of America’s top companies 
in support of a high-standard US-China bilateral investment treaty.”). 
30 See Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment Agreements with 
Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, !!* AM. J. INT’L L. (#", (#(-#' ("&!$) (discussing the 
“‘risk reduction’ function of IIAs” and how IIAs seek to address the ine,ciencies and externalities 
that host states can impose on foreign investors). 
31 Id. at ($)-'&!. 
32 See id. at ($!. 
33 Id. at (#'-$& (explaining that one of the functions of IIAs is to prevent states from 
ine,ciently undervaluing the welfare of foreign +rms and discussing ways in which states may 
impose rent-seeking measures on foreign investors). 
34 See, e.g., U.N., Possible Reform, supra note !$, ¶¶ "&-() (noting widespread criticism of 
ISDS relating to process, outcomes, and lack of impartiality). 
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incorporating the ISDS mechanism have not achieved their objective of 
promoting increased FDI35 (although the majority of the literature seems to 
find that IIAs do promote FDI to some extent36). Other critics contend that 
ISDS enables investors to invalidate regulatory measures,37 gives foreign 
investors rights that domestic investors lack,38 and provides large multinational 
corporations with the upper hand over host-country governments.39 
In fact, it seems that the ISDS legitimacy crisis has arisen primarily 
because, in the past two decades, developed countries have increasingly found 
themselves as respondents to investor-state claims. For example, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),40 concluded in !##), was one of 
the .rst IIAs involving two developed countries, the United States and 
Canada.41 Following NAFTA’s entry into force, the United States and Canada 
found themselves as respondents to investor-state claims for the .rst time.42 
 
35 See, e.g., Lise Johnson, Brooke Skartvedt Güven & Jesse Coleman, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: What Are We Trying to Achieve? Does ISDS Get Us There?, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (Dec. !!, "&!)), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/"&!)/!"/!!/investor-state-dispute-settlement-what-are-we-
trying-to-achieve-does-isds-get-us-there [https://perma.cc/(*(H-)HX(] (“[E]vidence that investment 
treaties are actually effective at increasing investment flows is inconclusive, and indicates that for the vast 
majority of investors, IIAs are neither directly nor indirectly determinative of FDI decisions.”). 
36 See, e.g., U.S.-Mex.-Can. Trade Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Econ. & on Speci+c 
Indus. Sectors !$$, Inv. No. TPA !&'-&&*, USITC Pub. (##$ (Apr. "&!$) [hereinafter USITC 
Report] (“The literature generally +nds that bilateral investment treaties (BITs), of which ISDS 
provisions form a crucial part, increase investment, though a substantial minority of papers +nd no 
e-ect.”); cf. Sarah Hebous, Priyanka Kher & Trang Thu Tran, Regulatory Risk and FDI, in GLOBAL 
INVESTMENT COMPETITIVENESS REPORT "&!$/"&"&, at !"#, !"#, !*' (World Bank Grp. "&"&) 
(explaining that the World Bank’s analysis of a data set comprising “!(,&&& parent companies 
investing in nearly "#,&&& FDI green+eld and expansion projects across !%# host countries” 
established that “investor con+dence and FDI .ows increase with regulatory transparency, 
investment protection, and e-ective recourse” to dispute settlement, including ISDS). 
37 Cf. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., ')" U.S. "', '# ("&!() (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(“Substantively, by acquiescing to arbitration, a state permits private adjudicators to review its public 
policies and e-ectively annul the authoritative acts of its legislature, executive, and judiciary.”). 
38 See, e.g., Letter from Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. to U.S. Dep’t of State Advisory Comm. on 
Priv. Int’l L. "-* (May "*, "&!$), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article0
!&(&&context0sustainable_investment_staffpubs [https://perma.cc/)GAT-%F(R] (claiming that U.S. IIAs 
could afford foreign investors greater substantive rights than U.S. law affords domestic investors 
in the United States). 
39 See Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Paci%c Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose, WASH. 
POST (Feb. "', "&!'), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-settlement-
language-in-the-trans-paci+c-partnership/"&!'/&"/"'/ec))&'a"-bd!e-!!e(-b")(-
e'"&$a*bc$a$_story.html [https://perma.cc/NW%)-#N%S] (“[P]rogressives should oppose ISDS 
because it would allow big multinationals to weaken labor and environmental rules.”). 
40 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. !), !$$", Can.-Mex.-U.S., *" I.L.M. "#$ 
[hereinafter NAFTA]. 
41 PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD: A GUIDE TO 
NAFTA CASE LAW ON ARTICLE !!&' § ![A] ("&!*) (“NAFTA Chapter !! is also a milestone since it is 
the first investment agreement between two developed countries: Canada and the United States.”). 
42 See, e.g., Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/$#/*, 
Notice of Claim, ¶ !" (Oct. *&, !$$#), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-
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More recently, developed countries in Europe have faced their .rst ISDS 
disputes as respondents.43 For example, Germany, which concluded the 
world’s .rst IIA with Pakistan in !#$#,44 and which has concluded more IIAs 
than any other country in the world (!%'),45 found itself on the opposing end 
of two high-pro.le ISDS claims by Swedish power-generation company 
Vattenfall in "&&# and "&!". In the .rst dispute, Vattenfall sued Germany 
under the Energy Charter Treaty, alleging that, after it began construction of 
a government-approved coal-.red power plant in Germany, German 
authorities enacted a series of regulatory measures that arbitrarily delayed the 
plant’s construction and that imposed burdensome restrictions on it.46 The 
case settled in "&!&.47 In the second dispute, Vattenfall sued Germany for 
breaching a prohibition on unlawful expropriation under the Energy Charter 
Treaty after Germany implemented a measure to phase out nuclear power 
 
documents/italaw$&('.pdf [https://perma.cc/**#G-SQM#] (“[T]he United States itself directly 
breached Article !!&' of NAFTA, which imposes a,rmative duties on the United States to provide 
‘full protection and security’ . . . against third-party misconduct.”); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Gov’t of 
Can., Notice of Arbitration, at *-( (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Oct. *&, !$$#), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-documents/italaw#($&.pdf [https://perma.cc/V#YV-
TPY#] (“As a result of Canada’s actions, the Investor has su-ered economic harm to its Investment 
through interference with its operations, lost contracts and opportunities in Canada. The Investor 
alleges that the Government of Canada has breached its obligations under Chapter !! of the NAFTA 
. . . .”); DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § ![A] (noting that controversy about investor-state arbitration 
proceedings arose under NAFTA because, “for the very %rst time, [those proceedings] involved 
Canada and the United States as respondent States”). 
43 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Germany Faces Energy Charter Treaty Claim by Swedish Corp over 
Regulatory Squeeze on Coal-Fired Power Plant, INV. ARB. REP. (Apr. ", "&&$), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/germany-faces-energy-charter-treaty-claim-by-swedish-corp-over-
regulatory-squeeze-on-coal-fired-power-plant [https://perma.cc/AGG(-*CU#] (“In a rare development, 
a Western European state is facing an investment treaty arbitration, as Germany stands accused by the 
Swedish energy company Vattenfall of breaching various protections contained in the Energy 
Charter Treaty.”). 
44 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, "( INT’L LAW. %'', %'' (!$$&) (“West Germany 
and Pakistan signed the +rst BIT in !$'$.”). 
45 ANTHONY LUZZATTO GARDNER, STARS WITH STRIPES: THE ESSENTIAL PARTNERSHIP 
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES !&) ("&"&). 
46 See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, German Media Reveal Details of Vattenfall Claim v. Germany; 
NGOs Raise Enviro Fears as Two Arbitrators Named, INV. ARB. REP. (July !), "&&$), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/german-media-reveal-details-of-vattenfall-claim-v-germany-
ngos-raise-enviro-fears-as-two-arbitrators-named [https://perma.cc/'AUA-YT*A] (describing the 
“politically-motivated delays and onerous new restrictions” that the German government allegedly 
imposed, which Vattenfall argued breached Germany’s obligations under the Energy Charter Treaty). 
47 See Parties Announce Settlement of Dispute Over German Power Plant, INV. ARB. REP. (Aug. "#, 
"&!&), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/parties-announce-settlement-of-dispute-over-german-
power-plant [https://perma.cc/#REE-SAJV] (“A Swedish power company and the Federal Republic 
of Germany have reportedly settled their ICSID arbitration arising out of the stalemated construction 
of a controversial coal-fired power plant in the city of Hamburg.”). 
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plants in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.48 The measures required 
Vattenfall to immediately cease the operation of its nuclear reactors in 
Germany.49 The second Vattenfall dispute generated signi.cant backlash 
against ISDS from German civil society groups and government o+cials—
primarily because of the perception that it would be inequitable to 
compensate Vattenfall for adverse economic consequences it su,ered from 
Germany’s decision to eliminate nuclear-energy use.50 Moreover, the 
Vattenfall dispute mobilized German opposition to ISDS in T-TIP,51 which, 
among opposition from other quarters in E.U. Member States, led the 
European Union to pause T-TIP negotiations and develop the Investment 
Court System as an alternative to traditional ISDS.52 
Public backlash against ISDS claims like those brought by Vattenfall also 
energized the European Union’s participation in multilateral e,orts to reform 
the international investment law regime.53 The most signi.cant discussions 
have taken place under the auspices of Working Group III of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),54 through 
 
48 See Germany Is Sued at ICSID by Swedish Energy Company in Bid for Compensation for Losses Arising 
Out of Nuclear Phase-Out, INV. ARB. REP. (June !, "&!"), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/germany-
is-sued-at-icsid-by-swedish-energy-company-in-bid-for-compensation-for-losses-arising-out-of-
nuclear-phase-out [https://perma.cc/'F#D-$G"N] (reporting that the German government’s decision 
to “renounce[] the use of nuclear power” affected Vattenfall’s operations in Germany and that damages 
in the arbitration could exceed 1)&& million). The dispute recently settled, with Germany agreeing to 
pay Vattenfall an aggregate 1!.( billion in damages. See Press Release, Vattenfall, Understanding to 
Terminate Disputes on German Nuclear Phase Out (Mar. ', "&"!), https://group.vattenfall.com/press-
and-media/pressreleases/"&"!/understanding-to-terminate-disputes-on-german-nuclear-phase-out 
[https://perma.cc/S*KW-'#NH]. 
49 Alexsia T. Chan & Beverly K. Crawford, The Puzzle of Public Opposition to TTIP in Germany, 
!$ BUS. & POL. %#*, %$$-)&& ("&!)). 
50 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, VIVIAN C. JONES & RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R(**#), TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (T-TIP) 
NEGOTIATIONS *$ ("&!%) (“A .ashpoint in EU public debates has been certain high-pro+le ISDS 
cases, such as the investment treaty claim +led by Vattenfall, a Swedish energy company, against 
Germany after the latter initiated a phase-out of its nuclear power program.”). 
51 Chan & Crawford, supra note ($, at %#%. 
52 This pivot in E.U. international investment policy is discussed in detail in infra Section I.B. 
53 See AKHTAR ET AL., supra note '&, at (! (explaining that the European Commission released 
its Investment Court System proposal following the public backlash about ISDS arising from disputes 
such as Vattenfall’s second investor-state dispute with Germany). 
54 The U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is the main UN entity 
responsible for international trade issues. About UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/about [https://perma.cc/RY'D-S#D*]. Different working groups, 
organized by subject matter, “undertake the substantive preparatory work on topics on UNCITRAL’s” 
work agenda. Working Documents, UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/gateway [https://perma.cc/MXW'-*BMF]. In July "&!), UNCITRAL 
provided its Working Group III with a mandate to explore options for the reform of investor-state 
dispute settlement. United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., Rep. on the Work of Its Fiftieth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/)"/!), ¶¶ "%*-%( ("&!)). Since then, UNCITRAL Member States, under the aegis of 
Working Group III, have submitted a variety of proposals for ISDS reform, covering a range of 
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which Member States have o,ered a variety of multilateral ISDS reform 
proposals.55 One camp of governments, led by the European Union and its 
Member States, has advocated for systemic reform of the ISDS regime, 
including the establishment of a Multilateral Investment Court.56 Another 
bloc, which includes Chile, Japan, Israel, and the United States, has eschewed 
the Multilateral Investment Court option and focused on incremental 
reforms—such as increasing transparency in ISDS, guaranteeing the 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators, and drawing on state-managed 
instruments to ensure the legal correctness of treaty interpretation.57 A third, 
smaller cohort, which includes Brazil and South Africa, has advocated 
abolishing ISDS altogether.58 These competing visions embody the 
crossroads at which international investment law .nds itself. 
Having set out the broad contours of the legitimacy crisis facing the ISDS 
regime, this Part turns to the specific ISDS experiences of the European Union 
and the United States. It outlines the particular ISDS challenges each has 
grappled with, as well as the legal and policy responses that each has developed 
 
procedural and substantive issues. See Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, UNITED 
NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/*/investor-state 
[https://perma.cc/V"%L-EPMQ] (listing draft working papers and recent proposal submissions). 
55 See e.g., U.N., Possible Reform, supra note !$, ¶ "& (noting that concerns about procedural 
and substantive issues in ISDS “have been said to undermine the legitimacy of the ISDS regime 
and its democratic accountability”). 
56 See European Union and Its Member States, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS), U.N. Doc. A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!'$, ¶ ! (Jan. "(, "&!$) [hereinafter European 
Union, Possible Reform] (setting forth the “views of the European Union (EU) and its Member 
States on the possible establishment of a standing mechanism for the settlement of international 
investment disputes”). 
57 See, e.g., Gov’ts of Chile, Isr. & Japan, Proposal for Workplan of Working Group III 
Submitted by the Delegations of Chile, Israel and Japan, U.N. Doc. A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!%*, annex 
C(")(i)-(ii) (Mar. !', "&!$) (advocating for the Working Group to address concerns about ISDS in 
two stages: first compiling potential solutions—not including the adoption of a multilateral court 
system—and second determining appropriate methods for adopting potential solutions); Luke Eric 
Peterson, UNCITRAL Meetings on ISDS Reform Get Off to Bumpy Start, as Delegations Can’t Come to 
Consensus on Who Should Chair Sensitive Process—Entailing a Rare Vote, INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. $, "&!$), 
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/uncitral-meetings-on-isds-reform-gets-off-to-bumpy-start-as-
delegations-cant-come-to-consensus-on-who-should-chair-sensitive-process-entailing-a-rare-vote 
[https://perma.cc/UMM'-"G#W] (comparing the European Union, which “angl[ed] for substantial 
reforms of the ISDS system,” with governments like those of the United States and Japan, which 
“express[ed] great wariness about the need for dramatic change”). 
58 See Gov’t of Braz., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ¶¶ !-!', U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!)! (June !!, "&!$) (advocating for an investment facilitation and 
cooperation model instead of ISDS); Gov’t of S. Afr., Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS), ¶ !#, U.N. DOC. A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!)% (July !), "&!$) (“[T]here is need for 
an alternative to ISDS in the form of a more modern and structured dispute settlement process—
one that is better adapted to investment disputes that involve sustainable development, public policy 
issues and a range of di-erent stakeholders and interests.”) 
!%&" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !'#: !"(# 
to address those challenges. These legal and policy responses frame the 
boundaries of—and opportunity for—a successful E.U.-U.S. IIA negotiation. 
B. The E.U. Experience with Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
The European Union has taken a winding path to arrive at its current 
position on ISDS. Each step on that path is essential for understanding the 
European Union’s current commitment to an ISDS model that replaces 
traditional, ad hoc arbitration with an Investment Court System. To explain that 
path, this Section first examines the European Union’s response to a pronounced 
public backlash against traditional ISDS during the T-TIP negotiations: the 
development of the Investment Court System. Second, it explains the European 
Court of Justice’s (CJEU) opinion clarifying that the European Union and its 
Member States share competence over the adoption of ISDS mechanisms in 
E.U. IIAs, complicating the negotiation of IIAs with an ISDS mechanism. 
Third, it discusses the doubt cast on the European Union’s competence to 
include any type of ISDS mechanism in its IIAs by the CJEU’s defiant "&!( 
Achmea opinion, which declared all IIAs between E.U. Member States invalid 
on the ground that they contravened E.U. law. Fourth, this Section analyzes how 
the CJEU’s Opinion $/$%, issued shortly after the Achmea opinion, saved the 
European Union’s competence to negotiate ISDS provisions in its IIAs with 
non-E.U. Member States but effectively locked the European Union into a 
negotiating position that requires some form of appellate mechanism in its IIAs. 
!. The European Union’s Evolving ISDS Policy from "&!& to "&!$ 
The European Commission’s pivot in its negotiating position on ISDS 
during the "&!% T-TIP negotiations formed the political backdrop for the 
CJEU’s ISDS-related decisions.59 Since the European Union acquired the 
competence to regulate FDI and international trade in the Lisbon Treaty in 
"&&#,60 it has wrestled with legitimacy challenges to ISDS. The Lisbon Treaty 
amended the European Union’s foundational treaties—the Treaty on 
 
59 The European Commission leads trade and investment agreement negotiations with trading 
partners. JANA TITIEVSKAIA, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., PE %(".""$, EU TRADE POLICY 
!% ("&!$), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/"&!$/%("""$/EPRS_IDA("&!$)%("""$
_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/)WBX-TTX*]. 
60 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. "&%- 
&), May $, "&&#, "&&# O.J. (C!!') () [hereinafter TFEU] (stating that the European Union “shall 
contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, [and] the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment” through 
a “common commercial policy”); JOHANN ROBERT BASEDOW, THE EU IN THE GLOBAL 
INVESTMENT REGIME § *.!." ("&!)) (“Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in "&&$, the 
regulation of FDI [came] under the scope of the [Common Commercial Policy] and exclusive 
[European] Union competence.”). 
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European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community—with the latter renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).61 The scope of the Lisbon Treaty was broad: to 
clarify the European Union’s competencies, its relationship with Member 
States, and its institutional mechanics.62 As is relevant for this Comment, 
Part Five of the TFEU addresses the European Union’s competence vis-à-vis 
“External Action.”63 Article "&*, located in Title II (“Common Commercial 
Policy”) of Part Five, equips the European Union with the power to negotiate 
international agreements covering trade and FDI.64 
After acquiring that power, the European Union initially supported the 
inclusion of traditional ISDS provisions in its IIAs.65 Indeed, when it launched 
T-TIP negotiations with the United States in "&!%, the European Union’s 
negotiating objectives included securing an investment chapter with strong 
investor protections and an ISDS mechanism, provided that the chapter struck 
a proper balance between investment protection and the right to regulate.66 It 
soon became clear, however, that the European Parliament, which effectively 
wielded a veto over IIAs that the European Commission negotiated, would 
not approve an E.U.-U.S. IIA with the traditional ISDS mechanism.67 
In January "&!), under pressure from environmental and consumer groups 
who contended that ISDS would favor American corporations and undermine 
 
61 EEVA PAVY, EUR. PARLIAMENT, THE TREATY OF LISBON ! ("&"&), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_!.!.'.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWQ'-CE"F] (“The 
Treaty establishing the European Community is renamed the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’ and the term ‘Community’ is replaced by ‘Union’ throughout the text.”). 
62 See id. at " (explaining that “[t]he Treaty of Lisbon for the +rst time clari+es the powers of 
the Union,” including when the European Union and Member States share competencies, and “for 
the +rst time provides for a formal procedure to be followed by Member States wishing to withdraw 
from the European Union”). 
63 TFEU, supra note %&, pt. '. 
64 Id. pt. ', tit. II, art. "&). 
65 See European Commission Memorandum MEMO/!*/$', European Union and United 
States to Launch Negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership " (Feb. !*, "&!*) 
(“The aim is to achieve the highest levels of liberalisation and investment protection that both sides 
have negotiated to date in other trade deals.”). 
66 See Council Directive !!!&*/!*, ¶¶ ""-"* (Oct. $, "&!(), https://data.consilium.europa.eu
/doc/document/ST-!!!&*-"&!*-DCL-!/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/FJR*-"PXW] (explaining that the objectives 
of an E.U.-U.S. agreement should include “the highest standards of protection” that is “without prejudice to 
the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce . . . measures necessary to pursue legitimate 
public policy objectives”). 
67 See Resolution of # July "&!' Containing the European Parliament’s Recommendations to 
the European Commission on the Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), ¶¶ S("), S(")(d)(xv), "&!) O.J. (C "%') *', *$, (% (recommending that the 
Commission “replace the ISDS system with a new system for resolving disputes”). 
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E.U. Member State sovereignty,68 the European Commission halted T-TIP 
investment chapter negotiations so that it could hold public consultations on 
the inclusion of an ISDS mechanism in T-TIP.69 Between March and July of 
"&!), the Commission invited online comments on investment protection and 
ISDS in T-TIP.70 Although the consultations generated roughly !#$,&&& 
submissions, #*% were submitted using pre-populated answer forms created 
on various online platforms, many of which opposed the inclusion of ISDS in 
T-TIP.71 The more substantive comments came from roughly %,&&& E.U. 
citizens and )$& organizations (representing business and civil society) and 
reflected varied positions on the role of ISDS in T-TIP.72 
In May "&!$, after consulting other stakeholders in the European Union, 
the Commission released a concept paper in which it proposed replacing the 
traditional ISDS mechanism with a two-tiered Investment Court System, 
including an appellate mechanism.73 According to the concept paper, the 
Investment Court System would lay the groundwork for a permanent 
Multilateral Investment Court.74 The European Parliament, whose members 
are elected by E.U. Member State citizens,75 approved this proposed 
compromise on July (, "&!$.76 In short, the European Commission had 
 
68 EU Freezes Part of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations with US, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Jan. "!, 
"&!(), https://www.dw.com/en/eu-freezes-part-of-transatlantic-trade-negotiations-with-us/a-!)*
)%$&) [https://perma.cc/MB'(-EURJ]. 
69 European Commission Press Release IP/!(/'%, Commission to Consult European Public on 
Provisions in EU-US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Jan. "!, 
"&!() (announcing the E.U. Trade Commissioner’s decision to “consult the public on the investment 
provisions” of T-TIP following “unprecedented public interest” in the T-TIP negotiations). 
70 Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement, at "-*, # SWD * final (Jan. !*, "&!'). 
71 See id. at *, !& (stating that approximately !(',&&& of !'&,&&& replies were submitted by non-
governmental organizations that provided pre-prepared answers that respondents adhered to and 
that about '&,&&& of these responses contained general statements opposing T-TIP). 
72 See id. at !! (noting that the consultation database recorded *,!(( individual replies from 
citizens of the European Union and ((' individual replies from organizations such as “NGOs, 
academics, individual companies, trade union organisations, consumer protection groups, business 
association[s] and so on”); see also id. at *-( (identifying various concerns raised by public comments, 
including concerns about protecting Member States’ right to regulate, the functioning of tribunals, 
the appellate mechanism, and how ISDS would interact with domestic judicial systems). 
73 EUR. COMM’N, INVESTMENT IN TTIP AND BEYOND—THE PATH FOR REFORM !!, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/"&!'/may/tradoc_!'*(&#.PDF [https://perma.cc/'M%P-K'CR]. 
74 See id. at !!-!" (“Therefore, the EU should pursue the creation of one permanent court. . . . 
The objective would be to multilateralise the court either as a self-standing international body or by 
embedding it into an existing multilateral organization.”). 
75 Welcome to the European Parliament, EUR. PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-
parliament/en [https://perma.cc/R"'J-ET"P] (“The Members of the European Parliament are directly 
elected by voters in all Member States to represent people’s interests with regard to EU law-making and 
to make sure other EU institutions are working democratically.”). 
76 European Parliament Press Release, "&!'&)&"IPR)*%(', TTIP: Ease Access to US Market, 
Protect EU Standards, Reform Dispute Settlement (July #, "&!') https://www.europarl
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developed an ISDS mechanism that enjoyed more legitimacy in the eyes of 
the E.U. Member States than traditional, ad hoc arbitration. 
". Opinion !/$" 
Against this political backdrop, on May !', "&!*, the CJEU issued Opinion 
!/$", which determined the provisions of the E.U.-Singapore FTA that fell under 
the exclusive competence of the European Union, the shared competence of the 
European Union and its Member States, and the exclusive competence of the 
Member States.77 The decision clarified that while Article "&* of the TFEU gives 
the European Union exclusive competence over FDI, regulation over portfolio 
investment and the ISDS mechanism are matters of shared competence between 
the European Union and its Member States.78 Thus, E.U. FTAs that regulate 
portfolio investment or that provide for some form of ISDS, such as the E.U.-
Singapore FTA, must be ratified by each E.U. Member State.79 
For the time being, then, the Investment Court System that the European 
Union had introduced into the E.U.-Singapore FTA and the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada could proceed, 
provided that Member States unanimously rati.ed those agreements’ 
provisions on the ISDS mechanism. But the decision did not resolve the 
thornier issue of whether ISDS itself—included in traditional, ad hoc form 
or within an Investment Court System—complied with E.U. law.80 The 
resolution of that fundamental question would wait until Belgium posed the 
question directly to the CJEU in Opinion $/$%. 
 
.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/"&!'/)/press_release/"&!'&)&"IPR)*%('/"&!'&)&"IPR)*%('_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GDQ$-SZR*] (explaining that the European Parliament approved a 
recommendation to the European Commission that the European Union should include an 
investment court system with an appellate mechanism in T-TIP). 
77 Op. "/!' of the Ct., ECLI:EU:C:"&!):*)%, ¶ ! (May !%, "&!)). 
78 Id. ¶¶ ""%-(*. The CJEU concluded that “the European Union does not have exclusive 
competence to conclude an international agreement with the Republic of Singapore in so far as it 
relates to the protection of non-direct foreign investments.” Id. ¶ "*#. But, the CJEU continued, 
“the commitments contained in Section A of Chapter $ of the envisaged agreement fall within the 
common commercial policy of the European Union and, therefore, within the latter’s exclusive 
competence.” Id. ¶ "(*. 
79 Id. ¶¶ "$"-$* (“Such a regime, which removes disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the Member States, cannot be of a purely ancillary nature within the meaning of the case-law 
recalled in paragraph ")% of this opinion and cannot, therefore, be established without the Member 
States’ consent.”). 
80 See, e.g., George A. Bermann, European Union Law and International Arbitration at a 
Crossroads, (" FORDHAM INT’L L.J. $%), $)% ("&!$) (“The question whether EU law autonomy bars 
an international court or tribunal from interpreting and applying EU law will take center stage in 
what is to be the CJEU’s Opinion !/!) on the compatibility with EU law of the [CETA].”). 
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%. Achmea 
Before releasing Opinion $/$%, however, the CJEU issued the seminal Achmea 
decision, which induced further handwringing among those hoping to see the 
European Union’s Investment Court System—let alone any type of ISDS 
mechanism—endure as a feature of E.U. IIAs.81 In Achmea, the CJEU considered 
whether IIAs concluded between E.U. Member States contravened E.U. law.82 
In the underlying dispute, the Dutch insurance company Achmea sued 
Slovakia under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, contending that Slovakia had 
breached its treaty obligations to provide fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
and to avoid indirect expropriation without prompt and e,ective 
compensation.83 In an UNCITRAL-based arbitration registered at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and seated in Germany, Slovakia contended 
that the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT’s ISDS provision contravened E.U. law 
and was therefore void, depriving the tribunal of jurisdiction.84 The tribunal 
rejected Slovakia’s argument and awarded damages to Achmea at the merits 
stage of the arbitration.85 
Slovakia then sought to have the award reversed in the Higher Regional 
Court of Frankfurt am Main, and then on appeal before the German Federal 
Court of Justice, on the basis that the award was null and void and contrary 
to public policy.86 Slovakia argued that the tribunal erred by determining for 
itself that Article ( of the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was compatible with 
E.U. law, because Articles "'* and %)) of the TFEU provide that the CJEU 
has exclusive jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the interpretation 
of E.U. law, and because Member States must submit disputes concerning 
interpretation or application of E.U. law via the TFEU’s preliminary 
reference procedure.87 Because these alleged con/icts between the BIT and 
Articles "'* and %)) of the TFEU were issues of .rst impression, the German 
 
81 See, e.g., Carola Glinski, Achmea and Its Implications for Investor Dispute Settlement !$-"! (Univ. 
of Copenhagen Fac. of L. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper, Working Paper No. "&!$-)&) ("&!$), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol*/papers.cfm?abstract_id0*"$!")$ (“[I]t remains to be seen how far the 
decisive considerations of the Achmea ruling, namely the autonomy of EU law and the principle of 
loyalty, also extend to an extra-EU context and whether the safeguards enshrined in CETA might 
be regarded as su,cient.”). 
82 Case C-"#(/!%, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:"&!#:!'#, ¶¶ !-" (Mar. %, "&!#). This case concerned a BIT between the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and Slovakia, both E.U. Member States. Id. ¶ ). 
83 Id. ¶¶ *, #-$. 
84 Id. ¶¶ !&-!". 
85 Id. ¶ !". 
86 Id. ¶¶ ', !". 
87 Id. ¶ !(; see also TFEU, supra note %&, art. "%) (de+ning the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction 
over preliminary rulings); id. art. *(( (barring E.U. Member States from submitting questions 
requiring the interpretation or application of E.U. law to courts or tribunals besides those authorized 
to interpret and apply E.U. law under the TFEU). 
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Federal Court of Justice referred the question of compatibility of intra-E.U. 
BIT ISDS mechanisms with E.U. law to the CJEU.88 
Before the CJEU issued its ruling, its Advocate General89 concluded in a 
thorough, forty-eight page opinion that the ISDS mechanism in the 
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT did not breach Articles "'* or %)) of the TFEU.90 
First, the Advocate General contended that arbitration tribunals 
contemplated by Article ( of the BIT quali.ed as “courts or tribunals” within 
the meaning of Article "'* of the TFEU and the case law interpreting it: the 
tribunals were established by law, were supported by permanent arbitral 
institutions, commanded compulsory jurisdiction, applied “rules of law,” and 
provided independent and impartial adjudication.91 Second, he reasoned that 
Article %)) of the TFEU does not bar intra-E.U. BITs—such as the one 
between the Netherlands and Slovakia—because the arbitral tribunals 
established by intra-E.U. BITs are “courts or tribunals” within the meaning 
of Article "'* of the TFEU, disputes between investors and states arising out 
of those BITs do not fall within the scope of Article %)) of the TFEU, and 
those BITs do not alter the allocation of power .xed by the E.U. treaties.92 
In a mere eleven-page opinion, however, the CJEU held instead that the 
intra-E.U. BIT contravened E.U. law. It reasoned that the dispute resolution 
clause in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT required tribunals to “interpret or 
indeed to apply E.U. law” within the meaning of Article %)) of the TFEU—
even though, according to the CJEU, arbitral tribunals are not “courts or 
tribunals” within the meaning of Article "'* of the TFEU.93 The Court 
further reasoned that, although awards issued by tribunals contemplated by 
the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT could be subject to annulment proceedings in 
courts that were part of the preliminary reference system—as the German 
Federal Court of Justice was in this case—the BIT’s annulment mechanism 
still did not properly bring the tribunals issuing such awards within the scope 
of the preliminary reference system.94 
Finally, the Court held that the ISDS mechanism in the Netherlands-
Slovakia BIT undermined the principle of mutual and sincere cooperation 
 
88 Case C-"#(/!%, Op. of Advoc. Gen., ECLI:EU:C:"&!):%$$, ¶¶ ", "$-*& (Sept. !$, "&!)). 
89 See id. The Advocate General issues advisory opinions to the CJEU on how the court should 
resolve the issues presented in the disputes pending before it. See RAFA! MA"KO, EUR. 
PARLIAMENTARY RSCH. SERV., PE %("."*), ROLE OF ADVOCATES GENERAL AT THE CJEU ' 
("&!$) (noting that although these opinions are “merely advisory,” the CJEU usually references them). 
90 Case C-"#(/!%, Op. of Advoc. Gen., ¶ ")*. 
91 Id. ¶¶ $&-!!$. 
92 Id. ¶¶ !'*-")". 
93 Case C-"#(/!%, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:"&!#:!'#, ¶¶ *$-($ (Mar. %, "&!#). 
94 Id. ¶¶ '"-''. 
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enshrined in Article )(%) of the TEU,95 because the BIT applied between two 
E.U. Member States and undermined the autonomy of the E.U. order as 
established by Article %)) of the TFEU.96 In this respect—and against the 
background of the Investment Court System the European Commission had 
recently proposed for its pending FTAs with non-E.U. Member States—the 
CJEU distinguished arbitral tribunals established under intra-E.U. BITs 
from those established under treaties between the European Union and non-
E.U. Member States.97 The CJEU concluded that the European Union 
maintained the competence to conclude international agreements that 
contained arbitration mechanisms with non-E.U. countries, “provided that 
the autonomy of the E.U. and its legal order is respected.”98 
The Achmea decision reverberated through the international arbitration 
community and raised several important questions. Those questions included 
how exactly E.U. Member States would go about terminating the !#' intra-
E.U. BITs in force, as well as the e,ect that the judgment would have on 
Member State commitments to each other vis-à-vis the Energy Charter 
Treaty,99 a multilateral IIA to which multiple E.U. Member States, and the 
European Union itself, are parties.100 
More important for the purpose of this Comment, however, was the 
CJEU’s quali.er in Achmea that international agreements between the 
European Union and non-E.U. countries containing extra-E.U. settlement 
mechanisms could comply with E.U. law only if “the autonomy of the E.U. 
and its legal order [was] respected.”101 Did the Investment Court System that 
now served as the centerpiece of the European Union’s ISDS negotiating 
position in its FTAs with the United States, Canada, and Singapore 
undermine the autonomy of the European Union and its legal order?102 
 
95 Article ((*) of the TEU provides, in relevant part, that “[p]ursuant to the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which .ow from the Treaties.” Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union, art. ((*), Oct. "%, "&!", "&!" O.J. (C *"%) !#. 
96 Id. ¶¶ ')-%&. 
97 Id. ¶ '). 
98 Id. 
99 Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. !), !$$(, "&#& U.N.T.S. $'. 
100 On May ', "&"&, twenty-three E.U. Member States signed a treaty terminating intra-E.U. 
BITs, which was designed to implement the Achmea judgment. Agreement for the Termination of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European Union, May ', "&"&, 
"&"& O.J. (L !%$) !, pmbl., arts. "-(, annex A. 
101  Case C-"#(/!%, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:"&!#:!'#, ¶ ') (Mar. %, "&!#). 
102 Cf. Bermann, supra note #&, at $)# (considering whether the CJEU would hold that CETA’s 
Investment Court System, as established under the treaty, respected the European Union’s autonomy 
and legal order, and arguing that “[o]ne can only hope that EU law public policy will not get in the 
way of the authority of CETA tribunals . . . to perform substantive review of EU law measures”). 
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).  CETA and Opinion $/$%  
A year and a half after Achmea, the CJEU answered that question in 
Opinion $/$%. Underlying this opinion was the rati.cation of CETA’s 
Investment Court System. Under Opinion !/$", every E.U. Member State 
needed to ratify CETA’s Investment Court System for it to become 
e,ective.103 Thus, the rati.cation of CETA ground to a halt as Wallonia, 
which has one of Belgium’s .ve sub-federal parliaments,104 threatened to 
block Belgium’s approval of the Investment Court System.105 To secure 
Wallonia’s support for CETA, Belgium referred the question of the 
compatibility of CETA’s Investment Court System with E.U. law to the 
CJEU, which resulted in Opinion $/$%.106 
Understanding Opinion $/$% requires understanding the CETA 
investment chapter’s basic elements. This subsection therefore explains those 
elements before examining Opinion $/$%.107 
a. Structure and Content of the CETA Investment Chapter 
Like most IIAs, the CETA investment chapter maps onto substantive and 
procedural categories. Sections A through E of the chapter address 
substantive provisions related to the protection of investments. These include 
 
103 See Op. "/!' of the Ct., ECLI:EU:C:"&!):*)%, ¶ *&' (May !%, "&!)) (holding that ISDS 
provisions, including the Investment Court System, fall within the shared competence of the European 
Union and its Member States); European Parliament Press Release "&!)&"&$IPR%!)"#, CETA: MEPs 
Back EU-Canada Trade Agreement (Feb. !', "&!)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/"&!)&"&$IPR%!)"#/ceta-meps-back-eu-canada-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/RH#J-(L)U] 
(“As CETA was declared a mixed agreement by the European Commission in July "&!%, it will also 
need to be ratified by national and regional parliaments.”); see also Jennifer Rankin, Belgian Politicians 
Drop Opposition to EU-Canada Trade Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. "%, "&!%), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/"&!%/oct/")/belgium-reaches-deal-with-wallonia-over-eu-canada-
trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/BG$P-%CJD] (noting that CETA “will only become a complete and 
permanent legal document following ratification by at least *# national and regional parliaments in Europe”). 
104 GARDNER, supra note (', at !!&. 
105 See id. (“The Walloon parliament persisted with its objections to CETA until the very last 
moment, nearly killing the deal in the spring of "&!% against the wishes of the remaining $$% of the 
EU population.”). 
106 See Laurens Ankersmit, Investment Court System in CETA to Be Judged by the ECJ, EUR. L. 
BLOG (Oct. *!, "&!%) https://europeanlawblog.eu/"&!%/!&/*!/investment-court-system-in-ceta-to-
be-judged-by-the-ecj [https://perma.cc/*QDD-R"FG] (“[T]he Walloon parliament wanted to know 
whether ICS [Investment Court System] is compatible with the EU Treaties, and asked the Belgian 
federal government to make use of the procedure of Article "!#(!!) TFEU to request the CJEU’s 
opinion on the issue.”). 
107 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EU-CANADA FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) preamble (Feb. "&!%) (“CETA con+rms all the innovations of the 
EU’s new approach on investment and its dispute settlement mechanism thus meeting the high 
expectations of citizens and industry for a fairer, more transparent and institutionalised system of 
settling investment disputes.”). 
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the commitment by Canada and the European Union not to discriminate 
against foreign investments on the basis of nationality,108 to provide fair and 
equitable treatment to investors and their investments,109 and to avoid direct 
and indirect expropriation without prompt and e,ective compensation.110 
Most of these substantive provisions are consistent with those found in 
most IIAs, although a few stand out. Article (.#, for example, contains four 
paragraphs that a+rm the parties’ regulatory sovereignty,111 including the 
right to regulate to “achieve legitimate [public] policy objectives.”112 Article 
(.!& is notable for attempting to tackle one of the thornier investment 
protection standards, fair and equitable treatment, by providing a closed set 
of circumstances that constitute breaches of the FET standard.113 Indeed, in 
drafting Article (.!&, Canada and the European Union sought to circumscribe 
the conditions that could result in a FET breach.114 This approach di,ers 
from that taken by the United States, and thus presents an opportunity for 
substantive investment protection harmonization in an E.U.-U.S. FTA.115 
The most relevant features of CETA for the CJEU opinion, however, 
pertain to dispute settlement—especially the sections and articles responsible 
for establishing and operating CETA’s Investment Court System. Section F 
of CETA establishes the treaty’s Investment Court System.116 Article (."* 
provides for a standing Tribunal, which e,ectively functions as a trial court 
of .rst instance.117 The Tribunal will comprise .fteen members, .ve of whom 
 
108 See CETA, supra note !(, art. #.%.! (“Each Party shall accord to an investor of the other 
Party and to a covered investment, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords, in 
like situations to its own investors and to their investments . . . .”); id. art. #.).! (“Each Party shall 
accord to an investor of the other Party and to a covered investment, treatment no less favourable 
than the treatment it accords in like situations, to investors of a third country and to their 
investments . . . .”). 
109 Id. art. #.!&.! (providing that each party shall provide “fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security” to investors and covered investments). 
110 Id. art. #.!".! (prohibiting parties from nationalizing or expropriating covered investments 
either directly or indirectly, subject to enumerated exceptions and conditions). 
111 See id. art. #.$." (“[T]he mere fact that a Party regulates, including through a modi+cation 
to its laws, in a manner which negatively a-ects an investment or interferes with an investor’s 
expectations, including its expectations of pro+ts, does not amount to a breach of an obligation 
under this Section.”). 
112 Id. art. #.$.!. 
113 Id. art. #.!&.". 
114 See Joint Interpretive Instrument on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) art. %(c), Can.-European Union, opened for signature Oct. "), "&!%, "&!) O.J. (L !!) * (“CETA 
includes clearly de+ned investment protection standards, including on fair and equitable treatment 
and expropriation and provides clear guidance to dispute resolution Tribunals on how these 
standards should be applied.”). 
115 See infra subsection II.B.". 
116 CETA, supra note !(, § F, art. #.!#-.('. 
117 Id. art. #."); see also art. #.!#.! (“[A]n investor of a Party may submit to the Tribunal 
constituted under this Section a claim that the other Party has breached an obligation . . . .”). 
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will be Canadian nationals, .ve of whom will be E.U. Member State 
nationals, and .ve of whom will be third-country nationals.118 In a novel 
development relative to traditional investor-state arbitration, the CETA Joint 
Committee, which is co-chaired by the Minister for International Trade of 
Canada and the European Commission’s Trade Commissioner, will choose 
the Tribunal members.119 In other words, unlike in traditional investor-state 
arbitration,120 investors will not nominate any Tribunal members. The 
President of the Tribunal will appoint members of the Tribunal to three-
member “divisions” of the Tribunal to hear speci.c disputes, on a “rotation 
basis.”121 Each division will include one Canadian national, one E.U. Member 
State national, and one third-country national.122 
CETA Article (."( establishes an Appellate Tribunal to hear appeals of 
Tribunal decisions for “errors in the application or interpretation of 
applicable law,” “manifest errors in the appreciation of facts,” and the grounds 
on which awards may be annulled under the ICSID Convention.123 Unlike 
Article (."*, Article (."( does not impose nationality requirements on the 
Appellate Tribunal members, although Article (."( provides that the CETA 
Joint Committee will appoint the members of the Appellate Tribunal124 and 
that “division[s] of the Appellate Tribunal constituted to hear [an] appeal 
shall consist of three randomly appointed Members of the Appellate 
Tribunal.”125 The establishment of an appellate mechanism is novel in IIAs126 
and forms a cornerstone of the European Commission’s mandate for 
negotiating IIAs.127 A .nal provision that would prove pivotal in the CJEU’s 
Opinion $/$% is CETA Article (.%!.", which states: 
 
118 Id. art. #.").". 
119 Id. 
120 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. *)(")(b) (providing that an arbitration 
tribunal may “consist of three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who 
shall be the president of the Tribunal, appointed by agreement of the parties”). 
121 CETA Article #.").) does not clarify the phrase “on a rotation basis,” except to note that its 
purpose is to “ensur[e] that the composition of the divisions is random and unpredictable, while 
giving equal opportunity to all Members of the Tribunal to serve.” CETA, supra note !(, art. #.").). 
122 Id. art. #.").%. 
123 Id. art. #."#.!; #."#."(a)-(c). 
124 Id. art. #."#.*. 
125 Id. art. #."#.'. 
126 As discussed in infra subsection I.C.!, some U.S. IIAs have contemplated the establishment 
of an appeals mechanism, but the United States has never followed through and established an 
appellate mechanism in any of these IIAs. 
127 EUR. COMM’N, NEW INVESTMENT PROTECTION AGREEMENTS ( ("&"&), 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/"&"&/july/tradoc_!'#$&#.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD(C-
PUW(] (explaining that the European Union’s recently concluded and prospective IIAs “introduce 
an appeal system,” which is a “revolution in dispute settlement” designed to strengthen the 
legitimacy of dispute settlement under those IIAs (emphasis omitted)). 
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For greater certainty, in determining the consistency of a measure with this 
Agreement, the Tribunal may consider, as appropriate, the domestic law of 
the disputing Party as a matter of fact. In doing so, the Tribunal shall follow 
the prevailing interpretation given to the domestic law by the courts or 
authorities of that Party and any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal 
shall not be binding upon the courts or the authorities of that Party.128 
By incorporating this language, the CETA parties seemed to go out of 
their way to ensure that the CJEU would not .nd that CETA tribunals were 
authorized to “interpret or apply” E.U. law within the meaning of Article "'* 
TFEU—a .nding that underpinned the CJEU’s holding in Achmea that intra-
E.U. IIAs were invalid under E.U. law.129 With those provisions of CETA 
explained, this Comment can turn to consider Opinion $/$%. 
b. Opinion !/!* 
In Opinion $/$%, the CJEU confronted whether CETA’s Investment Court 
System complied with E.U. law.130 As noted above, the answer to that 
question was not straightforward following the CJEU’s proviso in Achmea 
that an ISDS mechanism to which the European Union submitted itself 
needed to respect the “autonomy of the E.U. and its legal order.”131 Indeed, 
the CJEU highlighted this concern at the outset of its Opinion $/$% analysis, 
explaining that CETA “may be compatible with E.U. law only if it has no 
adverse e,ect on the autonomy of the E.U. legal order.”132 
In concluding that CETA’s Investment Court System did not undermine 
the autonomy of the E.U. legal order, the CJEU relied on the following chain 
of reasoning. First, it explained that for the CETA Investment Court System 
to avoid disturbing the autonomy of E.U. law, the Tribunal and Appellate 
Tribunal would need to be restricted to interpreting and applying E.U. law 
only insofar as (a) that law was part of CETA,133 and (b) the interpretation 
and application of E.U. law did not “prevent[] the EU institutions from 
operating in accordance with the EU constitutional framework.”134 To 
conclude that CETA satis.ed these conditions, the CJEU leaned on CETA 
Article (.%!."—especially its provision that the Tribunal and the Appellate 
 
128 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*!." (emphasis added). 
129 See supra subsection I.B.*. 
130 Op. !/!) of the Ct., ECLI:EU:C:"&!$:*(!, ¶ ! (May *&, "&!$). 
131 Case C-"#(/!%, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:"&!#:!'#, ¶ ') (Mar. %, "&!#). 
132 Op. !/!), ¶ !&#. 
133 Id. ¶ !!$ (“[I]t is necessary to be satis+ed that . . . Section F of Chapter Eight of the CETA 
does not confer on the envisaged tribunals any power to interpret or apply EU law other than the 
power to interpret and apply the provisions of that agreement . . . .”). 
134 Id. ¶ !!#. 
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Tribunal would treat domestic laws only as “matter[s] of fact.”135 This 
language convinced the CJEU that the CETA Tribunal and Appellate 
Tribunal would not interpret or apply E.U. law, except for E.U. law that 
follows from the CETA Agreement.136 
Second, the CJEU concluded that CETA did not alter the operation of 
E.U. institutions vis-à-vis the European Union’s constitutional framework 
and, therefore, did not a,ect the autonomy of the E.U. legal order.137 Here, 
the CJEU responded to a concern raised by Belgium that the award of a 
CETA Tribunal division might force the European Union or an E.U. 
Member State to repeal or amend a measure that caused the breach leading 
to an award.138 In response, the CJEU explained that CETA’s investment 
protection provisions cannot be interpreted to prevent a party from adopting 
measures that E.U. members deem necessary “to protect public security or 
public morals or to maintain public order or to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health;”139 that Article (.#.! a+rms the parties’ right to regulate to 
achieve legitimate public policy objectives; and that Article (.#." provides 
that the mere fact that an investor’s expectations are not satis.ed by a party’s 
regulations does not constitute a breach of the treaty.140 
In short, then, Opinion $/$% resolved lingering doubts about the 
compatibility of the European Union’s Investment Court System with E.U. 
law, emboldening the European Commission to negotiate an Investment 
Court System in its IIAs and to push for a Multilateral Investment Court. 
Unfortunately for the European Union, however, it would not .nd a partner 
eager to embrace the Investment Court System model in the United States. 
C. The U.S. Experience with Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Like the E.U. position on ISDS, the U.S. position has shifted in response 
to ISDS criticisms. Although those criticisms have led the United States to 
entertain the possibility of an appellate mechanism under the aegis of a 
multilateral institution, the United States has not embraced an investment 
court model. As with the European Union’s negotiating position, 
 
135 Id. ¶ !*& (quoting CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*!."). 
136 Id. ¶ !*% (“It follows from the foregoing that Section F of Chapter Eight of the CETA does 
not confer on the envisaged [CETA] tribunals any jurisdiction to interpret or apply EU law other 
than that relating to the provisions of that agreement.”). 
137 Id. ¶ !%!. 
138 Id. ¶¶ !*)-'&. Opinion $/$& explains that, under CETA Article #.*$, CETA tribunals may 
not nullify contested measures or regulations allegedly breaching the treaty provisions, nor may they 
impose penalties on parties for having enacted such measures. Id. ¶ !((. Instead, a tribunal may only 
order that the respondent compensate the claimant for damages su-ered because of a breach. Id. 
139 Id. ¶ !'" (citing CETA, supra note !(, art. "#.*."). 
140 Id. ¶ !'(. 
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understanding the bounds of the current U.S. negotiating position on ISDS 
requires an examination of the U.S. experience with ISDS. This subsection 
therefore discusses the evolution of U.S. ISDS policy from NAFTA to T-
TIP. In turn, it explains the U.S. position on ISDS during the 
contemporaneous T-TIP and Transpaci.c Partnership (TPP) negotiations, 
and the subsequent pivot toward ISDS skepticism during the Trump 
Administration. Finally, it explains why the U.S. criticism of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body is inextricably linked to its 
negotiating position on ISDS. 
!. From NAFTA to T-TIP 
Although the United States signed its .rst modern IIA in !#(",141 it did 
not begin to grapple with criticisms of ISDS until after NAFTA entered into 
force, when it found itself as the respondent in ISDS disputes for the .rst 
time—like many developed European countries more recently.142 An 
especially controversial issue that emerged during these early disputes was 
tribunals’ interpretation of NAFTA’s guarantee that the NAFTA parties 
provide investors of another NAFTA party with fair and equitable treatment. 
Speci.cally, NAFTA Article !!&$(!) provides the following: “Each Party shall 
accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance 
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security.”143 
The FET standard is nearly ubiquitous in IIAs,144 including the CETA 
agreement between Canada and the European Union.145 Controversy about 
this standard emerged when some early NAFTA tribunals interpreted Article 
!!&$(!) expansively. For example, the tribunal in Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada 
concluded that Article !!&$(!)’s FET standard required host states to accord 
investors treatment above that required by customary international law.146 
The Pope & Talbot tribunal acknowledged that Article !!&$(!)’s plain language 
 
141 Wayne Sachs, The “New” U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, " INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. !$", 
!$" (!$#() (noting, in !$#(, that the United States “recently signed the +rst four of an anticipated 
series of bilateral treaties concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
142 DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § ![A]. 
143 NAFTA, supra note (&, art. !!&'(!). 
144 See International Investment Agreements Navigator—Mapping of IIA Content, UNCTAD, 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/iia-mapping 
[https://perma.cc/#*"E-T"D"] (choose fair and equitable treatment from the Standards of 
Treatment dropdown; then choose “FET Unquali+ed” and “FET Quali+ed”; then enter search).  
145 See supra subsection I.B.(. 
146 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase ", ¶¶ !!&-"& (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. Apr. !&, "&&!), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita&%)#.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KDV"-WD)K]. 
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suggested that the FET standard referred to in Article !!&$(!) was tied to 
customary international law.147 Nonetheless, the tribunal emphasized that 
Canada and the United States were parties to other IIAs that treated the FET 
standard as distinct from customary international law’s minimum standard of 
treatment.148 According to the tribunal, because those treaties formed sources 
of international law within the meaning of Article %( of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice,149 the FET standard as described in those IIAs 
meant that NAFTA’s Article !!&$(!) FET standard required treatment above 
the international minimum standard.150 
The NAFTA parties would soon reject the Pope & Talbot tribunal’s 
expansive interpretation of Article !!&$(!), as well as similarly expansive 
interpretations of Article !!&$(!) by the tribunals in Metalclad v. Mexico and 
S.D. Myers v. Canada.151 In "&&!, Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
issued a Joint Interpretive Statement clarifying that Article !!&$(!) prescribed 
the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law and 
that Article !!&$(!) did not require the NAFTA countries to accord foreign 
investors treatment above the minimum standard.152 
In the .fteen years following the clari.cation of Article !!&$(!), the United 
States took successive measures designed to shore up the perceived legitimacy 
of U.S. IIAs. The principal instrument the United States used to reshape its 
policy position on the procedure and substance of IIAs during this period was 
the U.S. Model BIT.153 The Model BIT, co-drafted by USTR and the U.S. 
 
147 Id. ¶ !!&. 
148 Id. ¶¶ !!&-!!. 
149 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. *#. 
150 Pope & Talbot Inc., ¶¶ !!*-!#. 
151 In Metalclad v. Mexico, the tribunal determined that Mexico breached the FET standard 
because it did not “ensure a transparent and predictable framework for [the investor’s] business 
planning and investment.” Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/$)/!, Award, ¶¶ $$-!&! (Aug. *&, "&&&), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita&'!&.pdf [https://perma.cc/$)FZ-CHJP]. In S.D. Myers v. Canada, a majority of the 
tribunal found that a breach of a separate NAFTA provision, Article !!&" (containing NAFTA’s 
national treatment standard for investments), “essentially establishes a breach of Article !!&'” because, 
the tribunal reasoned, Article !!&' encompassed a broader scope than Article !!&" did. S.D. Meyers, 
Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, ¶¶ "%(-%% (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. !*, "&&&), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita&)().pdf [https://perma.cc/F"P*-AN"J]. 
152 See Interpretations of Chapter !!, Can.-Mex.-U.S., § B("), July *!, "&&!, https://"&&$-
"&!).state.gov/documents/organization/*#)$&.pdf [https://perma.cc/'EPS-WL%J] (“The concepts of 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to 
or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment 
of aliens.”). See generally DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § ".&"[A] (describing the history and challenges of 
determining the “ordinary meaning” of “fair and equitable” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
153 See AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note !), at # (noting that by developing model BITs, the 
United States “clari+ed the objectives for their investment programs and re-evaluated the balance 
of rights for investors and other economic and non-economic policy priorities (environment, labor, 
social welfare, etc.) provided in their future investment agreements”). 
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State Department,154 provides the default text that the United States uses to 
negotiate IIAs with other countries.155 
Although the precise content of the U.S. Model BIT has evolved, its basic 
structure has remained the same since "&&).156 It begins with a preamble 
providing that reciprocal protection of foreign investors “will stimulate the 
/ow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties.”157 The 
preamble also provides that the BIT aims to protect investors “in a manner 
consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the 
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights.”158 Thus, the preamble 
establishes that the BIT should be interpreted to respect states’ measures 
designed to protect public health, safety, the environment, and labor rights.159 
Section A of the Model BIT establishes the substantive provisions of the 
BIT, which include obligations to accord the investors of the treaty 
counterparty national treatment (i.e., to treat foreign investors no less 
favorably than domestic investors in like circumstances);160 most-favored 
nation treatment;161 and fair and equitable treatment.162 Section A also 
requires treaty parties to refrain from direct and indirect expropriation, except 
when the expropriation is executed for a public purpose, is non-discriminatory, 
and provides prompt, adequate, and effective compensation to the investor 
subject to the expropriation in accordance with due process of law.163 
Section B of the Model BIT addresses dispute settlement. It enables 
covered foreign investors to submit investment disputes with the treaty 
 
154 See id. (“The [U.S. Model BIT program] is jointly administered by the Department of State 
and the United States Trade Representative (USTR).”). 
155 See Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
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156 The United States developed its Model BIT in !$#!. See AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note !), 
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157 "&&( Model BIT, pmbl., https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/U.S.%"&model%"&BIT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/*F$J-(XEV]; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', pmbl. 
158 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), pmbl.; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', pmbl. 
159 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty’s text must be interpreted 
in light of its object and purpose, which includes the treaty’s preamble. See Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. *!(!)-("), opened for signature May "*, !$%$, !!'' U.N.T.S. **! [hereinafter 
VCLT]. Although the United States has not rati+ed the VCLT, it treats the VCLT as codifying 
customary international law. See B-Mex, LLC v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
Arb(AF)/!%/*, Second Submission of the United States of America, ¶ !% n."% (Aug. !), "&!#), 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/"&!$/&'/Second-U.S.-!!"#-Submission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/(NXW-AF%L] (“Although the United States is not a party to the [Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties], it has recognized since at least !$)! that the Convention is the 
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160 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), art. *; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', art. *. 
161 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), art. (; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', art. (.  
162 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), art. '; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', art. '. 
163 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), art. %; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', art. %. 
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counterparty to arbitration, after the foreign investor and treaty counterparty 
have sought to resolve their dispute through consultation and negotiation.164 
It further provides that the foreign investor may elect to have the arbitration 
governed by the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings or 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, as administered by ICSID, among other 
institutional rules.165 That the U.S. Model BIT is designed to work with 
ICSID enhances the feasibility of adding an appeals mechanism within 
ICSID, as discussed in subsection II.B.!. 
The "&&) and "&!" versions of the Model BIT also emphasize that the 
investment protection provisions of the BIT operate without prejudice to 
states’ right to regulate.166 The "&&) Model BIT, for example, introduced 
provisions seeking to balance power between investors and states.167 Unlike 
NAFTA Chapter !!,168 the "&&) Model BIT included articles clarifying that 
investment protections provided in the BIT could not be construed as 
circumscribing a treaty party’s right to adopt measures regulating the 
environment169 or to enforce labor standards.170 
Article "(.!& of the "&&) Model BIT also explicitly contemplated the 
development of a multilateral agreement establishing an appellate body to hear 
disputes arising out of IIAs.171 Article "(.!& further provided that parties to the 
BIT would seek to enable such an appellate body to review awards of disputes 
arising under the BIT.172 This provision mirrored a negotiating directive in the 
Trade Act of "&&" that directed the USTR to negotiate ISDS mechanisms that 
“provid[ed] for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence 
to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements.”173 
In "&!", USTR and the State Department released the "&!" U.S. Model 
BIT, which replaced the "&&) U.S. Model BIT.174 The "&!" Model BIT 
 
164 "&&( Model BIT, supra note !'), arts. "*-"(; "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', arts. "*-"(. 
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168 See NAFTA, supra note (&, arts. !!&!-*$. 
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171 Id. art. "#.!&. 
172 Id. 
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174 See AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note !), at !& (“Changes in the "&!" U.S. Model BIT were 
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environmental issues . . . .”). The "&!" Model BIT also re.ected the work of a three-year study 
undertaken by the Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy 
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enhanced the U.S. commitment to protecting fundamental public policy 
objectives in its IIAs. For example, Article !" of the "&!" Model BIT, entitled 
“Investment and Environment,” provides an expansive carveout of 
environmental measures from the reach of investment protection provisions, 
while Article !%, entitled “Investment and Labor,” binds the parties to respect 
a comprehensive set of labor rights.175 On dispute settlement, the "&!" Model 
BIT, like the "&&) Model BIT, entertains the possibility of an appellate 
mechanism, albeit in more guarded terms than in the "&&) Model BIT.176 
". T-TIP Round One 
The foregoing legitimacy-enhancing measures, culminating in the "&!" 
Model BIT, seemed to bode well for an investment chapter in T-TIP, which the 
European Union and the United States began negotiating in July "&!%.177 The 
European Union and the United Sates aimed to make T-TIP a comprehensive 
FTA, meaning that the treaty would address market access barriers across a 
range of sectors, regulatory cooperation and harmonization, and investment 
protection.178 The U.S. emphasis on safeguarding regulatory space in IIAs, in 
particular, aligned with the European Union’s negotiating position leading into 
the T-TIP negotiations.179 Nevertheless, a T-TIP investment chapter faced 
opposition in the United States. The simultaneous negotiations of T-TIP and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)180 amplified public scrutiny of ISDS in the 
 
(ACIEP)—comprising representatives from NGOs and the private sector—about how to modernize 
the U.S. Model BIT. Id. 
175 "&!" Model BIT, supra note "', arts. !"-!*. 
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177 AKHTAR ET AL., supra note '&, at !. 
178 See White House Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (June "&!*), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-o,ces/press-o,ce/fact-
sheets/"&!*/june/wh-ttip [https://perma.cc/ZC"W-*$P)] (outlining the parties’ goals for T-TIP 
negotiations, which included promoting “rules-based investment,” trade and access to markets, and 
regulatory cooperation). 
179 See Council Directive !!!&*/!*, supra note %%, ¶ "* (explaining that even before the European 
Union reformed its position on the ISDS mechanism to favor an Investment Court System, it 
entered the T-TIP negotiations with an emphasis on safeguarding states’ right to regulate). 
180 The TPP was a comprehensive, plurilateral FTA that the United States negotiated with 
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United States, as civil society groups and certain politicians, including U.S. 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, sounded the alarm about ISDS undermining U.S. 
sovereignty and favoring multinational corporations.181 
In "&!$, President Barack Obama barely secured a renewal of Trade 
Promotion Authority182—and only with the signi.cant support of 
Republicans183—partly because of the inclusion of the traditional ISDS 
mechanism in the TPP.184 Trade Promotion Authority supplies USTR with 
negotiating objectives for international trade and investment agreements, and 
enables the President to submit implementing legislation for those 
agreements to Congress for consideration under an expedited timeframe,185 
without the opportunity for Congress to amend the legislation.186 For the 
context of renewed E.U.-U.S. FTA negotiations, it bears noting that the "&!$ 
Trade Promotion Authority directs the USTR to seek to negotiate an 
“appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the 
interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements.”187 Moreover, it 
 
provided for ISDS. See id. at (!-(" (describing debate over whether to include the ISDS provision 
as “contentious”). Although the United States signed the TPP in February "&!%, President Trump 
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184 See, e.g., Ben White, Obama Aides: Warren “Baseless” on Trade, POLITICO (May ), "&!', !":&* AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/"&!'/&'/obama-aides-elizabeth-warren-trade-!!))&* [https://perma.cc/QB$S-
NYYU] (noting that U.S. Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren expressed concern that including ISDS in 
the TPP agreement “could allow multinational corporations to sue in secretive international tribunals to gut 
U.S. laws while winning big taxpayer-funded awards”). 
185 See !$ U.S.C. § "!$!(e) (providing that Senate and House committees have no longer than 
forty-+ve days to review proposed implementing legislation before that implementing legislation is 
put to a vote in each house of Congress). 
186 Id. § "!$!(d) (“No amendment to an implementing bill or approval resolution shall be in 
order in either the House of Representatives or the Senate; and no motion to suspend the application 
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instructs USTR to negotiate IIAs that “provid[e] meaningful procedures for 
resolving investment disputes.”188 
Amid the domestic criticism of ISDS stoked by the T-TIP and the TPP 
negotiations, USTR balked at the European Union’s proposed Investment 
Court System,189 which the European Union formally proposed including in 
T-TIP in November "&!$.190 Similarly, U.S. business groups opposed 
including the Investment Court System in T-TIP.191 Instead, the United 
States continued to push for traditional ISDS—that is, ad hoc arbitration, 
with no appeals mechanism—as modeled in the "&!" U.S. BIT.192 Ultimately, 
however, the investment chapter of T-TIP died with the termination of the 
T-TIP negotiations after the Trump Administration assumed o+ce.193 As 
discussed below, the Trump Administration instead addressed international 
investment policy primarily in the context of renegotiating NAFTA. 
%. The Turn in U.S. International Investment Policy 
The United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USCMA), 
negotiated at the behest of the Trump Administration to replace NAFTA and 
concluded on November %&, "&!(,194 marked a shift in U.S. policy on the 
procedural aspects of ISDS. Although the USMCA maintained the core 
substantive investment protections from the "&!" Model BIT,195 it eliminated 
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the ISDS mechanism between the United States and Canada, and narrowed 
its application between the United States and Mexico.196 Between the United 
States and Mexico, the USMCA preserves the ISDS mechanism for investors 
in most sectors, but only for a subset of the investment chapter’s substantive 
investment protections: national treatment, most-favored nation treatment, 
and direct expropriation.197 Moreover, investors in most sectors may submit 
claims to arbitration only after they have exhausted local remedies—that is, 
after receiving a .nal judgment from a national court or after having pursued 
the claim in a national court for thirty months, whichever is earlier.198 The 
USMCA carves out an exception to those rules between the United States 
and Mexico for investors across .ve sectors—oil and gas, power generation, 
telecommunications, transportation, and infrastructure—whose claims arise 
out of a covered government contract.199 Those investors may bring ISDS 
claims that invoke the full range of investment protections provided by the 
USMCA, including indirect expropriation and fair and equitable treatment, 
and they do not need to exhaust local remedies.200 
There are few publicly available statements explaining the decision to 
eliminate the ISDS mechanism between the United States and Canada in the 
USMCA. In July "&"&, then-Deputy U.S. Trade Representative C.J. 
Mahoney reasoned that an ISDS mechanism was unnecessary between 
Canada and the United States given similarities in the two countries’ judicial 
systems.201 A closer examination, however, suggests a more nuanced rationale 
for scrapping the ISDS mechanism between Canada and the United States. 
As discussed in subsection I.B.), Canada and the European Union—two 
trading and investment partners that, as a general proposition, also have 
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still claim that the host state has breached USMCA’s minimum standard of treatment and indirect 
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in a state-to-state proceeding. See id. art. *!."(b) (explaining that the treaty parties can bring claims 
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independent legal systems202—agreed to include the E.U.-developed 
investment court system in CETA.203 Although Canada has not publicly 
championed the Investment Court System as the European Union has, it has 
nevertheless endorsed the system by ratifying CETA.204 Indeed, during the 
USCMA negotiations, a spokesman for Canada’s foreign ministry explicitly 
linked its negotiating position on USMCA to the CETA Investment Court 
System: “We’ve proposed a comprehensive investment chapter with a 
progressive approach to ISDS building o, the CETA.”205 
Conversely, the United States has maintained its opposition to an 
Investment Court System model. For example, at the thirty-eighth session of 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group III in January "&"&, the U.S. delegation 
doubted the value of an appellate mechanism focused on developing coherent 
jurisprudence,206 a goal of the European Union’s Investment Court System 
and its appeals mechanism207—although the U.S. delegation did seem to 
entertain the concept of a more narrowly tailored appellate mechanism that 
worked with other tools the United States has to ensure the correct 
interpretation of its IIAs.208 These tools include the provisions found in 
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dispute settlement process.”). 
207 European Union, Possible Reform, supra note '%, ¶ (! (“Predictability and consistency can 
only be e-ectively developed through the establishment of a standing mechanism with permanent, 
full-time adjudicators. This is the key problem of the existing system.”). 
208 U.S. Working Group III Statements, supra note "&%, at !!:&%:"'-!!:!!:&) (“To the extent we 
are having an appellate mechanism create and enforce consistency in a stare decisis way . . . really 
does take the duty of states to manage the meaning of treaties out of their hands and put it in a 
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"&"!] T-TIP Negotiations Round Two !%"% 
modern U.S. IIAs allowing the non-disputing parties to submit briefs on the 
proper interpretation of the relevant IIA.209 The U.S. delegation’s statements 
suggest that omission of an ISDS mechanism between Canada and the United 
States in the USMCA may have resulted partly from disagreement over 
Canada’s endorsement of the Investment Court System; however, these 
statements also suggest that the United States might support an appellate 
mechanism focused squarely on the correctness of arbitral awards. This 
proposition is developed in subsection II.B.!. It remains unclear whether the 
Biden Administration will adopt the same position on an appellate procedure 
or will consider an appellate mechanism that also aims to promote coherence 
in international investment law. 
The decision to narrow the scope of the ISDS mechanism in the USMCA 
between the United States and Mexico appears more straightforward: it 
stemmed from a Trump Administration concern that ISDS promoted the 
outsourcing of U.S. jobs to Mexico. In a "&!( House Ways and Means 
Committee hearing, then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer 
explained this position during his testimony in an exchange with then-House 
Ways and Means Chairman Kevin Brady. There, Ambassador Lighthizer laid 
out the Trump Administration’s position on ISDS in the following terms: 
So I think [ISDS] is something we have to think about very carefully. Our 
view was that rather than have this mandatory ISDS provision, which we 
think is a problem in terms of our sovereignty in the United States, encourages 
outsourcing and losing jobs in the United States, and by the way, lowering 
standards in a variety of places, that we should be very careful before we put 
something like that into place.210 
Ambassador Lighthizer reiterated this view in a more recent New York 
Times op-ed, in which he characterized ISDS provisions in U.S. IIAs as a 
form of “political risk insurance for any American company that wanted to 
send jobs abroad.”211 The Ambassador did not support his position that ISDS 
encourages outsourcing before the Ways and Means Committee or in his op-
ed with any evidence.212 Nevertheless, given the concern among some that 
 
209 See, e.g., USCMA art. !(.D.)." (“The non-disputing . . . Party may make oral and written 
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("&!#) (statement of Robert E. Lighthizer, Ambassador, United States Trade Rep.). 
211 Robert E. Lighthizer, Opinion, The Era of Offshoring U.S. Jobs Is Over, N.Y. TIMES (May !!, "&"&), 
https://www.nytimes.com/"&"&/&'/!!/opinion/coronavirus-jobs-offshoring.html [https://perma.
cc/(VUU-AG"T]. 
212 Lauren Mandell, The Trump Administration’s Impact on US Investment Policy, ICSID REV. !, !" 
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[https://perma.cc/YS'N-HC#H] (“Ambassador Lighthizer did not provide then, or since, evidence to 
support a relationship between ISDS and job loss, and his critique of ISDS contains certain inaccuracies.”). 
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NAFTA’s trade—as opposed to investment—chapters resulted in the loss of 
U.S. jobs to Mexico,213 and given the Ambassador’s position that ISDS 
encourages outsourcing to lower wage countries, the decision to narrow the 
scope of ISDS between the United States and Mexico was unsurprising. In 
any event, the outsourcing concern does not apply with equal force to an 
investment chapter in an FTA between the United States and the European 
Union, as the United States is less concerned with the potential risk of 
outsourcing jobs to European countries. 
In summary, the USMCA outcome on ISDS does not sound the death 
knell for ISDS in an E.U.-U.S. IIA. Instead, it suggests that any type of 
appellate mechanism pursued would need to be narrowly tailored to ensure 
that appellate tribunals (!) do not wrest away the authority of the United 
States and European Union to adopt .nal, binding interpretations of the IIA, 
and (") allow the United States and European Union to deliver non-
disputing-party submissions in investor-state disputes arising under the IIA. 
). The Relevance of the U.S. Position on the WTO’s Appellate Body 
Finally, any appellate mechanism to which the United States might agree 
in an E.U.-U.S. IIA must account for the longstanding U.S. criticism of the 
WTO’s Appellate Body, which the Trump Administration allowed to cease 
functioning in December "&!#.214 Accounting for this U.S. position is critical, 
because the European Union’s e,ort to use an Investment Court System to 
promote consistency and coherence in international investment law cuts 
against one of the foremost reasons that the United States allowed the 
Appellate Body to collapse: the U.S. perception that the Appellate Body 
unjusti.ably tried to create a system of de facto stare decisis through its 
reports, even though, according to the United States, the WTO Member 
States never intended for it to ful.ll that function.215 
 
213 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R(($#!, NAFTA 
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"&"!] T-TIP Negotiations Round Two !%"$ 
To appreciate the importance of the U.S. concern that the Appellate Body 
unjusti.ably accorded its own reports precedential weight, it is critical to 
understand the basic legal structure that governs WTO dispute settlement. 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which comprises all the WTO 
members, administers the WTO’s dispute settlement system.216 In 
administering the dispute settlement system, it formally adopts reports 
issued by WTO panels and the WTO’s Appellate Body.217 
Articles Six through Sixteen of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) establish the process for panels to adjudicate disputes between WTO 
members. Panels function like ad hoc tribunals in investor-state arbitration 
in that they comprise three members218 and are composed for the sole purpose 
of adjudicating a particular dispute between WTO members.219 More 
speci.cally, panels .nd facts and apply WTO law to those facts.220 Although 
the WTO’s Secretariat draws panelists for particular disputes from a roster 
that WTO members help to populate,221 and the WTO’s budget covers 
panelists’ expenses,222 panelists are not employees of the WTO, just as 
arbitrators in investor-state disputes are not employees of administering or 
appointing institutions. 
Article Seventeen of the DSU establishes the rules for appellate review of 
reports issued by WTO panels. It limits the Appellate Body’s review of appeals 
to issues of law,223 allowing it to “uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings 
and conclusions of the panel” below.224 As is relevant for the U.S. critique of 
the Appellate Body, Article Seventeen provides that the Appellate Body issues 
reports—not decisions or awards—which the WTO Member States, acting 
together as the DSB, must formally adopt or reject.225 In other words, the 
WTO Member States technically have the final decision on interpretation and 
application of the WTO’s agreements to discrete disputes.226 
Additionally, Article %." of the DSU provides that the adoption of such 
reports cannot “add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the 
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covered agreements.”227 Instead, a related agreement, the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO 
Agreement), provides a speci.c procedure for WTO Member States to adopt 
binding interpretations of the WTO agreements.228 This procedure 
resembles the NAFTA procedure that Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
used to adopt a binding interpretation of NAFTA Article !!&$(!).229 
In its !*)-page report on the alleged errors of the Appellate Body, the 
United States argued that the Appellate Body ignored the text and structure 
of the DSU and the Marrakesh Agreement by instructing panels to follow its 
legal interpretations in future disputes involving the same WTO agreement 
provisions.230 More speci.cally, the United States identi.ed the Appellate 
Body’s Report in United States—Stainless Steel (Mexico) as introducing the 
/awed concept that panels should treat prior Appellate Body reports as de 
facto precedent in order to ensure predictability and stability in the 
interpretation of the WTO’s agreements.231 According to the United States, 
this approach threatened to “add to or diminish” the rights of the WTO’s 
Member States, an action prohibited by Article %." of the DSU.232 In 
criticizing the Appellate Body’s approach, however, the United States did not 
reject the proposition that Appellate Body reports can serve as persuasive 
authority in future disputes.233 Rather, it rejected the view that the DSU and 
the Marrakesh Agreement leave the Appellate Body with any room to assign 
its reports precedential weight.234 
Because the U.S. perception that the Appellate Body assigned its own 
reports precedential value motivated the U.S. decision to allow the Appellate 
Body to collapse, it is likely that similar concerns would animate the United 
States’ evaluation of an appellate mechanism in an E.U.-U.S. IIA. Nonetheless, 
as noted in the preceding paragraph, the U.S. Appellate Body critique also 
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recognizes the role for allowing appellate reports to serve as persuasive 
authority.235 This suggests that the United States might endorse an appeals 
mechanism in an E.U.-U.S. IIA if the IIA provided explicitly that appellate 
decisions lacked de jure or de facto stare decisis effect, and if the United States 
and European Union reserved the right to deliver non-disputing-party 
submissions and to adopt authoritative interpretations of the IIA. This 
Comment’s proposed appellate mechanism incorporates these assumptions. 
II. ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW AND PROTECTING TRANSATLANTIC INVESTMENT THROUGH AN 
E.U.-U.S. IIA 
Within the bounds of their negotiating positions described in Part I, the 
European Union and the United States have an opportunity to negotiate an 
IIA that reasserts the legitimacy of international investment law and protects 
transatlantic investment. This logic is developed in Section A below. Section 
B, in turn, proposes the design of such an IIA. First, it advocates for dispute 
settlement that preserves ad hoc arbitration but adds an appellate mechanism 
embedded within ICSID. Second, it argues that the European Union and 
United States can draft substantive provisions that create more ex ante 
certainty for investors and states about what measures will and will not breach 
the treaty’s substantive obligations. 
A. The Rationale for Investor-State Dispute Settlement in an E.U.-U.S. FTA 
Despite their di,erences on how to tackle international investment law’s 
legitimacy crisis, the European Union and United States should include an 
investment chapter in an FTA that they negotiate. First, given their collective 
economic power and consistent pursuit of FTAs with other countries, they 
have the opportunity to design a progressive investment chapter that charts 
a new path for international investment law. Second, a properly drafted IIA 
between the European Union and United States will simultaneously establish 
a more stable and attractive transatlantic investment environment and ensure 
that legitimate public policy measures do not trigger host-state liability. 
!. Strengthening the Legitimacy of International Investment Law 
Notwithstanding the gap between the current U.S. and E.U. positions on 
ISDS, the opportunity to redirect the trajectory of international investment 
law is too important for the United States and the European Union to jettison 
any form of ISDS in an E.U.-U.S. FTA. Given the combined in/uence of 
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the European Union and United States on international investment,236 a 
progressive investment chapter in an E.U.-U.S. FTA would help shape the 
rules of the international investment law regime for the rest of the twenty-
.rst century. Speci.cally, an investment chapter in an E.U.-U.S. FTA would 
create a vehicle to address the principal procedural and substantive concerns 
raised in the multilateral debate on ISDS reform. 
The alternatives—an investment chapter with no ISDS mechanism or no 
investment chapter at all—risk letting a gap in the E.U. and U.S. positions 
widen into a chasm, as the European Union forges ahead with its vision for a 
Multilateral Investment Court and the United States presses for IIAs with 
traditional, ad hoc ISDS or removes the ISDS mechanism from its future 
IIAs altogether. The pursuit of divergent IIA models is not in the long-term 
interest of the United States or the European Union. From the U.S. 
perspective, returning to state-to-state dispute settlement, which would 
follow from excluding the ISDS mechanism in IIAs, risks repoliticizing 
investor-state disputes—thereby undermining the predictability and stability 
that international investment law is supposed to support237—and putting U.S. 
businesses at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis investors from other 
countries that do have access to ISDS with the European Union.238 From the 
E.U. perspective, a Multilateral Investment Court without U.S. support is 
unlikely to gain much traction, given that the United States accounts for the 
largest share of inward and outward FDI of any country in the world.239 
Removing ISDS from an E.U.-U.S. FTA would also undermine the 
development of international investment law by creating contradictory 
positions in E.U. and U.S. international investment law policies. Specifically, 
removing ISDS from an E.U.-U.S. FTA on the ground that both the United 
States and the European Union (and many of its Member States) have well-
developed domestic legal systems might undermine support for ISDS from 
developing countries, with whom both the European Union and the United 
States have negotiated IIAs that do include ISDS. In other words, if the 
European Union and United States scrapped ISDS from an E.U.-U.S. IIA, 
developing countries might justifiably perceive the inclusion of ISDS in 
developed country-developing country IIAs as discriminating against them vis-
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à-vis developed country-developed country IIAs.240 And developed countries 
choosing to include ISDS because of their static perception of a treaty 
counterparty’s legal system undermines the legitimacy of international 
investment law: it reduces ISDS to a realpolitik calculus, which is precisely the 
type of political maneuvering that ISDS was designed to eliminate.241 
Moreover, if the European Union were to argue for removing ISDS from 
an E.U.-U.S. IIA on the basis that foreign investors in developed countries 
should rely on domestic legal systems, it would undermine the legitimacy of 
CETA, which includes ISDS between two developed trade and investment 
partners, albeit using the European Union’s preferred Investment Court 
System format.242 
". The Importance of Bilateral Investment Between the European Union 
and United States 
The second reason for including ISDS in an E.U.-U.S. FTA is pragmatic 
and addresses the more immediate interests of the United States and 
European Union: ensuring the stability and protection of a signi.cant, 
mutually bene.cial volume of transatlantic FDI. In "&!#, for example, 
cumulative FDI stock exchanged between the United States and the 
European Union approached -$ trillion, making it the largest bilateral FDI 
relationship in the world.243 Moreover, E.U.-U.S. FDI supports ).) million 
jobs in the European Union and ).! million jobs in the United States.244 In 
short, ensuring the predictability and stability of this FDI is important to 
both the United States and European Union. Although this volume of FDI 
stock has accumulated in the absence of an IIA between the United States 
and European Union,245 an IIA with ISDS would provide a neutral forum for 
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resolving investment disputes that will inevitably arise between the two 
parties and their investors. 
Because an IIA would create a neutral forum for resolving investment 
disputes, it would also preempt the use of unilateral, retaliatory instruments 
by host governments on behalf of their investors, which have become 
increasingly popular in the current international economic environment—
including in economic relations between the United States and European 
Union. For example, consider the tari,s the United States has authorized 
against French imports in retaliation for a French tax on digital services 
companies operating in France.246 The French tax imposes a three percent 
charge on the gross revenues that digital services providers generate from 
providing “digital interface” services and “targeted advertising” services in 
France.247 The tax applies only to companies generating annual revenues of 
at least 0"$ million in France and 0*$& million globally from the pertinent 
digital interface services or targeted advertising.248 In investigating the tax 
under Section %&! of the !#*) Trade Act, USTR concluded that the tax 
constituted de facto discrimination against U.S. technology companies 
operating in France, because the design, structure, and operation of the tax 
led it to apply to large, U.S. technology companies, such as Google, Apple, 
Facebook, and Amazon—but not to smaller France-based technology 
companies or to large, France-based advertising companies that generated 
less than 0*$& million in global revenues from targeted advertising.249 In 
other words, according to the Section %&! report, France designed the tax so 
that it would target large U.S. technology companies and exempt homegrown 
technology and technology-enabled champions. 
The conclusions of the Section %&! report led the United States to 
authorize tari,s on roughly -!.% billion of French imports at an ad valorem 
rate of "$%, although the United States has delayed the implementation of 
those duties.250 As is relevant for this Comment, the United States authorized 
the imposition of tari,s despite protests from U.S.-based importers who 
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argued that the higher tari,s would cause them economic hardship.251 In other 
words, by authorizing tari,s as a countermeasure to France’s Digital Services 
Tax, the United States proposed a remedy that bene.tted one group of U.S. 
companies (digital services providers), while harming another group of U.S. 
companies (U.S. importers and distributors of goods from Europe). 
As with the tari,s imposed under the Section %&! investigation into 
China’s intellectual property practices,252 these tari,s and their adverse 
consequences for U.S. businesses could have been avoided if an IIA were in 
place between the United States and European Union: under an E.U.-U.S. 
IIA, the U.S. companies subject to de facto discrimination by the French 
government under the tax scheme could bring claims for violations of the 
IIA’s national treatment obligations.253 Unlike the tari,s that the United 
States authorized against France following the Section %&! investigation, the 
remedy in a successful ISDS claim against France—damages—would not 
cause collateral damage to U.S. businesses.254 
To date, investor-state arbitration tribunals apparently have not decided 
whether a company’s social media operations in a given host state constitutes 
a protected investment under IIAs. But analogizing from investor-state 
jurisprudence suggests that it probably does: tribunals have treated private-
party contracts that involve a nexus with the host state as protected 
investments,255 and U.S.-based technology companies’ digital services 
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activities in France involve such contracts.256 Moreover, tribunals have 
exercised jurisdiction when they found that discrete transactions cohered to 
form a single economic enterprise257—a scenario that characterizes digital 
services providers’ universe of contracts with advertisers providing targeted 
advertisements to consumers in France and digital interface users in France.258 
An E.U.-U.S. IIA would also protect U.S. investors in the European Union 
against mistreatment by certain E.U. Member States that have increasingly 
disregarded the rule of law—principally, Hungary and Poland.259 If the 
European Union cannot by its own legal or political mechanisms persuade 
Romania and Poland to respect the rule of law, perhaps raising the specter of 
paying damages to U.S. investors suing them under an ISDS mechanism 
will.260 And if Romania and Poland refused to honor their commitment to pay 
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(describing how France’s digital services tax applies to revenue generated from U.S. companies’ 
digital interface and targeted advertising services that have been provided in France). Digital 
interface providers, the +rst class of digital services companies subject to France’s Digital Services 
Tax, generate revenue through contracts with the users of their platforms. See id. at !#. Providers of 
targeted advertising services, the second class of companies subject to France’s Digital Services Tax, 
generate revenue through contracts with advertisers seeking to place their advertisements in front 
of certain consumers. See id. 
257 Horváth & Klinkmüller, supra note "'', at %&$-!!. 
258 See, e.g., SECTION *&! FRANCE’S DIGITAL SERVICES TAX (DST), supra note "(%, at "& 
(“[F]or Internet advertising, a company like Facebook could not go one-by-one through its contracts 
with advertisers and assess the share of ads placed under each contract that were seen by French users.”). 
259 See, e.g., European Parliament Press Release "&"&&!&$IPR%$$&), Rule of Law in Poland and 
Hungary Has Worsened (Jan. !%, "&"&), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert
/"&"&/!/press_release/"&"&&!&$IPR%$$&)/"&"&&!&$IPR%$$&)_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/*RG#-GJF#] 
(announcing E.U. concerns about the status of discussions with Hungry and Poland and the continued 
misalignment of those countries with the founding values of the European Union, including the rule 
of law). Hungary and Poland have opposed an E.U. mechanism that would condition access to E.U. 
funds on the “respect for EU values, including the independence of judges.” Mehreen Khan, Michael 
Peel & Valerie Hopkins, EU Reaches Deal to Suspend Funds to Member States that Breach Rule of Law, FIN. 
TIMES (Nov. ', "&"&), https://www.ft.com/content/'"*adf*c-&c(a-(!a)-$'")-"&b*%b&*$a$$ [https://
perma.cc/M$WF-**US]. Although the United States has an IIA with Poland, it was concluded in !$$(, 
see Treaty on Business and Economic Relations, Pol.-U.S., Mar. "!, !$$&, S. TREATY DOC. No. !&!-!# 
(!$$&), and therefore does not reflect the current U.S. position on ISDS, especially safeguarding states’ 
right to regulate. Thus, with respect to Poland, a modern IIA between the United States and the 
European Union would align better with the current U.S. position on international investment law. See 
supra subsection I.C.*. The United States does not have an IIA with Hungary. Hungary, UNITED 
NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/countries/$(/hungary [https://perma.cc/P'EB-DE"%]. 
260 Cf. R. Daniel Kelemen, Law, Fiscal Federalism, and Austerity, "" IND. J. GLO. LEGAL STUD. 
*)$, *$'-$# ("&!') (discussing the value of bond markets in holding E.U. Member States accountable 
to their +scal austerity pledges). 
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damages they incurred through ISDS proceedings, they would undermine their 
ability to attract future FDI and sovereign debt financing.261 
The European Union likewise has compelling reasons to negotiate an 
investment chapter that protects its investors who are investing in the United 
States. In "&!(, investors based in E.U. Member States, excluding the United 
Kingdom, accounted for about -" trillion in FDI stock in the United States.262 
Thus, the European Union has a significant interest in ensuring that its investors 
in the United States receive nondiscriminatory, equitable treatment. Although the 
United States has a well-developed rule of law,263 it is not immune from taking 
measures that can ground investor-state claims against the United States.264 
Moreover, the argument that U.S. or E.U. investors should pursue claims 
against the European Union and United States, respectively, in domestic 
courts is inconsistent with both governments’ positions on WTO dispute 
settlement.265 If one were to accept the logic that investors should pursue all 
claims of IIA breaches in domestic courts of a host state, then one would also 
need to conclude that exporters sending exports to that same state should 
pursue all claims of trade-agreement breaches in host-state courts, without 
recourse to the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Of course, neither the 
European Union nor the United States has suggested abandoning the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system: each recognizes the value of the neutral 
adjudication of international disputes.266 Indeed, ensuring a level playing 
 
261 Cf. Sykes, supra note *&, at '&! (“A host country that refuses to abide by ISDS rulings 
destroys its credibility with future investors and undermines its own rationale for entering IIA 
commitments to reduce ine,cient risk in the +rst place.”). 
262 AKHTAR, supra note ), at " +g.*. 
263 See, e.g., United States, WORLD JUST. PROJECT, https://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-
of-law-index/country/"&"&/United%"&States [https://perma.cc/*"(*-NGKG] (ranking the United 
States twenty-+rst out of !"# measured countries on its rule-of-law strength). 
264 See, e.g., TransCanada Corp. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB/!%/"!, Claimant’s 
Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ $-)", #$ (June "(, "&!%), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw)(&).pdf [https://perma.cc/SE(X-)A'$] (alleging that the United States breached several 
NAFTA provisions by delaying its processing of, and ultimately denying, TransCanada’s application for a 
presidential permit to build the Keystone XL pipeline); see also USITC Report, supra note *%, at !$%-$) box 
#.! (counting investor-state cases filed against the United States, as well as Canada and Mexico). 
265 See supra subsection I.C.(. Whatever its grievances with the WTO’s Appellate Body, the 
United States has not signaled an interest in abandoning the WTO’s dispute settlement system. 
266 Even though the United States has allowed the WTO’s Appellate Body to collapse, it has 
stated that it remains committed to the WTO’s dispute settlement system. REPORT ON THE 
APPELLATE BODY, supra note "!', at * (“Lasting and effective reform of the WTO dispute settlement 
system requires all WTO Members to come to terms with the failings of the Appellate Body.” 
(emphasis added)). The European Union has expressed even stronger support for the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, going so far as to establish an interim appellate mechanism with certain other 
WTO members while the entire WTO membership determines how to revive the Appellate Body. 
See European Commission Press Release, EU and !' World Trade Organization Members Establish 
Contingency Appeal Arrangement for Trade Disputes (Mar. "), "&"&), https://trade.ec.europa.eu
/doclib/press/index.cfm?id0"!") [https://perma.cc/TS#M-W%MN] (announcing the establishment of 
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.eld for its investors was one of the European Union’s core objectives in 
negotiating an investment chapter in the .rst round of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations.267 
Similarly, the argument that foreign investors should sue host 
governments in domestic courts tugs against longstanding U.S. law that 
allows plainti,s to bring diversity suits applying state law in federal district 
courts,268 and that allows defendants in diversity proceedings to remove civil 
actions .led in state courts to federal district courts.269 Diversity jurisdiction 
and the right to remove diversity cases probably originates from a concern 
that state courts may tilt the playing .eld in favor of the home party.270 
Indeed, federal courts continue to cite this rationale as the purpose behind 
the diversity and removal statutes.271 
In sum, the United States and the European Union should include an 
investment chapter with investor-state arbitration for two core reasons. First, 
negotiating a modern investment chapter would promote the legitimacy of 
international investment law, as it would signal to the rest of the world that 
the decision to negotiate an IIA does not reduce ISDS to a realpolitik calculus 
in which developed states exercise leverage over developing states. Second, 
an investment chapter would provide a neutral forum in which to resolve 
investment disputes that will inevitably arise between the two parties given 
the volume of FDI exchanged between the United States and European 
Union. Having established the rationale for an E.U.-U.S. IIA, this Comment 
turns to how to design an investment chapter that re/ects this rationale. 
 
the Multiparty Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, an appellate tribunal designed to operate 
while the WTO Appellate body is not functioning). 
267 Council Directive !!!&*/!*, supra note %%, ¶ "* (Oct. $, "&!() (explaining that T-TIP’s investment 
chapter should focus on providing “a level playing field for investors in the US and in the EU”). 
268 See "# U.S.C. § !**"(a)(!) (providing that federal district courts “shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions” in which the amount in controversy exceeds /)',&&& and the dispute 
involves citizens of di-erent states). 
269 See id. § !((!(a) (providing that defendants in civil actions subject to the original 
jurisdiction of federal district courts may remove such actions from state court to federal district 
court); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, !(C FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § *)"!, Westlaw (database updated Oct. "&"&) (“[E]ver since the original Judiciary Act 
of !)#$, there has been some provision for the removal of cases from state to federal courts.”) 
270 See id. (“Like the diversity of citizenship and alienage jurisdiction of the federal courts, the 
original right to remove probably was designed to protect nonresidents from the local prejudices of 
state courts.”) 
271 See, e.g., Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., ('% F.*d $**, $(& ($th Cir. "&&%) (“Removal based 
on diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect out-of-state defendants from possible prejudices in 
state court.”); J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, #!# F."d (&!, (&( ('th Cir. !$#)) (“Diversity 
jurisdiction exists for the purpose of providing a federal forum for out-of-state litigants where they 
are free from prejudice in favor of a local litigant.”); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note "%$, 
§ *)"! (collecting cases and explaining that federal judges continue to cite protection against actual 
or perceived state-court prejudice as the rationale behind diversity jurisdiction). 
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B. The Design of an E.U.-U.S. FTA Investment Chapter 
This Comment’s proposals for the core provisions of an E.U.-U.S. FTA 
investment chapter map onto two broad categories: (!) a dispute settlement 
system that combines traditional, ad hoc arbitration in the .rst instance with 
a new appellate mechanism; and (") substantive provisions governing 
investment protection. 
!. Dispute Settlement 
Most of the friction in the U.S. and E.U. positions on international 
investment law lies in the mechanism for resolving investor-state disputes. 
The following proposal should strike a workable middle-ground between the 
E.U. and U.S. positions: (a) the preservation of ad hoc ISDS in the .rst 
instance, with a number of procedural improvements on which the United 
States and European Union agree; and (b) the addition of an appellate 
mechanism at ICSID, to which investor-state disputes arising out of the 
E.U.-U.S. FTA could be appealed. This structure would preserve the bene.ts 
of ad hoc arbitration while introducing a mechanism that would ensure the 
legal correctness of arbitral decisions—without creating a system of precedent 
that would bind the European Union, United States, or their investors in 
future disputes. The following subsections lay out the core elements of this 
proposed system. 
a. Traditional Ad Hoc Arbitration in the First Instance 
This Comment argues for the preservation of ad hoc arbitration in the 
.rst instance because (!) many of the /aws in the existing ad hoc arbitration 
system have been resolved by the United States in its recent IIAs; and (") ad 
hoc arbitration is fundamentally a fair, neutral process of adjudication that 
accords with international investment law’s objective of depoliticizing 
investor-state disputes. 
First, the rationale for permanent, .rst-instance tribunals has abated, as 
the United States and other countries have demonstrated that tougher 
dispute resolution provisions can remedy perceived ISDS shortcomings 
without abandoning the ad hoc arbitration model. A comparison of the 
European Union’s and United States’ recently concluded IIAs demonstrates 
that, without the United States needing to abandon ad hoc arbitration, U.S. 
IIAs have tackled the same core procedural issues as the E.U. IIAs: a lack of 
transparency;272 rules governing the independence and impartiality of 
 
272 Compare USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.#." (“The tribunal shall conduct hearings open 
to the public and shall determine, in consultation with the disputing parties, the appropriate 
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arbitrators;273 the consolidation of parallel proceedings;274 lawyers serving as 
arbitrators in one case and as counsel in the next;275 and the disposition of 
meritless claims.276 These concerns lie at the heart of the global legitimacy 
crisis facing the ISDS regime.277 Accordingly, an IIA between the European 
Union and United States that preserved ad hoc arbitration in the .rst instance 
would help cement the emerging standards both parties have already 
endorsed, without needing to introduce the complexity and bureaucracy 
posed by a standing, .rst instance tribunal. 
Second, preserving ad hoc arbitration in an IIA between the European 
Union and United States is worthwhile because ad hoc arbitration is 
fundamentally a neutral, fair method for adjudicating disputes. In traditional, 
ad hoc arbitration, the investor appoints one arbitrator, the respondent 
country appoints another arbitrator, and the parties together appoint the 
chair of the tribunal.278 Absent agreement between the parties on the chair, 
the institution administering the arbitration appoints the chair.279 Thus, 
unlike the European Union’s Investment Court System, in which countries, 
not investors, appoint all the arbitrators who constitute tribunal divisions, in 
ad hoc arbitration, each litigant has an equal in/uence on the composition of 
 
logistical arrangements.”), with CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*%.' (“Hearings shall be open to the 
public.”). 
273 Compare USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.%.'(a) (mandating that arbitrators “comply with 
the International Bar Association Guidelines on Con.icts of Interest in International Arbitration”), 
with CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*&.! (same). 
274 Compare USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.!".! (permitting the ICSID Secretary-General 
to consolidate proceedings), with CETA, supra note !(, art. #.(*.! (providing a procedure for parties 
to request that tribunals consolidate proceedings). 
275 Compare USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.%.'(c) (providing that arbitrators shall not act as 
counsel or party-appointed expert or witness in another USMCA arbitration for the duration of the 
proceedings in which they are serving as arbitrators), with CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*&.! (“[U]pon 
appointment, [members of the tribunal] shall refrain from acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert 
or witness in any pending or new investment dispute under this or any other international agreement.”). 
276 Compare USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.).( (“[A] tribunal shall address and decide as a 
preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law . . . a claim is 
manifestly without legal merit.”), with CETA, supra note !(, art. #.**.! (“[T]he Tribunal shall 
address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of 
law, a claim . . . submitted pursuant to Article #."* is not a claim for which an award in favour of the 
claimant may be made under this Section . . . .”). 
277 See, e.g., U.N., Possible Reform, supra note !$, ¶ "& (listing concerns about the arbitral 
process and potential decision-makers that Member States expressed as “undermin[ing] the 
legitimacy of the ISDS regime and its democratic accountability”). 
278 See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) * (explaining the appointment process of arbitrators 
to the tribunal). 
279 See, e.g., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of Procedure 
for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) ((!) (providing for the Chair of ICSID’s 
Administrative Council to select a tribunal president if the parties request the Chair to do so or if 
the parties cannot agree on a tribunal president). 
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the tribunal that will hear its case. Further, institutional arbitration rules 
contain robust procedures for challenging arbitrators for lack of 
independence or impartiality.280 
b. The Appellate Mechanism 
Despite the virtues of the improved ad hoc arbitration model, it seems 
clear that some form of appellate mechanism will be necessary to ensure the 
conclusion of an IIA between the European Union and the United States. 
That is at least in part because, as described in Section I.B, the European 
Parliament and the CJEU have sanctioned E.U. IIAs that include an appellate 
mechanism, and because the European Union has risked too much political 
capital on the concept of appellate review in its IIAs to walk that position 
back. And although the United States has assailed the WTO’s Appellate 
Body, it has not publicly rejected an appellate mechanism in ISDS. In fact, 
as noted in subsection I.C.!, the "&&) and "&!" Model BITs, as well as "&!$ 
Trade Promotion Authority legislation, contemplate the incorporation of an 
appellate mechanism into U.S. IIAs. Moreover, while the United States has 
argued in the UNCITRAL Working Group III forum that states should rely 
on existing mechanisms that allow states to provide binding and nonbinding 
interpretations of IIAs,281 these instruments have existed since NAFTA 
entered into force,282 and have not resolved the legitimacy crisis that 
international investment law faces. 
To satisfy the E.U. and U.S. positions, as detailed in Sections I.B and I.C, 
the most workable mandate for appellate review would be one that focuses 
only on correcting legal errors made by ad hoc arbitration tribunals, not on 
promoting coherence in ISDS jurisprudence. Ad hoc tribunals, which must 
make sense of fact-driven proceedings and then correctly apply law to fact, 
may make legal errors. But aside from treaty parties issuing binding legal 
interpretations,283 IIAs providing for ad hoc arbitration do not contain 
 
280 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. ') (enabling a litigant to seek to disqualify 
an arbitrator on the basis that the arbitrator lacks independence, among other necessary qualities). 
281 U.S. Working Group III Statements, supra note "&%, at !(:*":&"-!(:*):*& (“[E]xisting tools, 
such as non-disputing party submissions and joint interpretations, should de+nitely be included and 
be pursued actively.”). 
282 See NAFTA, supra note (&, art. !!"# (“On written notice to the disputing parties, a Party 
may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of interpretation of this Agreement.”); id. art. 
!!*!(") (“An interpretation by the [NAFTA Free Trade] Commission of a provision of this 
Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.”). 
283 The joint interpretation of NAFTA Article !!&'(!) by Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States, discussed in subsection I.C.!, see supra note !'" and accompanying text, is an example of 
treaty parties issuing a binding interpretation of a treaty provision. 
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mechanisms to correct legal errors committed by tribunals.284 Moreover, 
binding treaty party interpretations do not resolve the issue of incorrect legal 
interpretations by ad hoc tribunals, because they apply only to prospective 
disputes or to disputes in which an award has not yet been issued, and because 
they require the treaty parties themselves to agree on the correct legal 
interpretation of a substantive provision to meaningfully influence 
interpretation of the pertinent treaty.285 And even if the European Union and 
the United States disagree over the role of an appellate mechanism in 
promoting coherence in jurisprudence, they seem to agree that appellate 
mechanisms are useful in correcting serious legal errors made by first-instance 
tribunals in international economic law.286 
Building on this logic, this Comment proposes the creation of an appellate 
mechanism that is formally based within ICSID. To be clear, this Comment is 
not the first work to propose an appellate mechanism generally or one within 
ICSID specifically. As discussed in subsection I.C.!, the U.S. "&&) and "&!" 
Model BITs provide for the possibility of an appeals mechanism. Within the 
context of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III, several states have raised the 
possibility of an appeals mechanism as a more flexible alternative to the European 
 
284 Under the USMCA, parties may seek the annulment of an award issued by an ad hoc 
arbitration panel. See USMCA, supra note !$', annex !(-D art. !(.D.!*.$(a) (providing that a party may 
not seek enforcement of a final award until annulment proceedings have completed, if those 
proceedings have been requested). But annulment results in the invalidation of an award, not in the 
correction of a legal error. See CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH 
& ANTHONY SINCLAIR, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY $&! ("d ed. "&&$) (“[T]he 
result of a successful application for an annulment is the invalidation of the original decision.”). 
285 See, e.g., USMCA, supra note !$', annex !(-D art. !(.D.$." (“A decision of the Commission 
on the interpretation of a provision of this Agreement under Article *&." (Functions of the 
Commission) shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or award issued by a tribunal must be 
consistent with that decision.”). USMCA Article *&.* explains that Commission decisions are taken 
by consensus—that is, Canada, Mexico, and the United States must agree on a decision for it to 
constitute an authoritative interpretation of the USMCA by the Commission. USMCA, supra note 
!$', art. *&.*. 
286 Compare European Union, Possible Reform, supra note '%, ¶ (* (“An appeal mechanism 
will ensure correctness. It will do this by reviewing the legal correctness of the decisions taken at +rst 
instance and by correcting any legal errors.” (emphasis added)), with REPORT ON THE APPELLATE 
BODY, supra note "!', at *#, !"& (explaining that “WTO Members agreed in the DSU to expressly 
limit the authority of the Appellate Body to review a panel’s legal +ndings, not its factual +ndings,” 
and therefore that “[t]he Appellate Body was intended by negotiators as a check in the rare event a 
panel report contained an egregious [legal] error” (emphasis added)). 
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Union’s proposed Multilateral Investment Court.287 And, in "&&), ICSID itself 
published a white paper exploring the concept of an appeals facility.288 
Instead, the novelty of this Comment’s appeals concept is twofold. First, 
it proposes a particular hybrid dispute settlement structure within an E.U.-
U.S. IIA that corresponds to the boundaries within which the European 
Union and United States can negotiate.289 Second, it recognizes and 
incorporates the inextricable relationship between international investment 
law and international trade law.290 For example, this Comment recognizes that 
an e,ective IIA between the European Union and United States must align 
with their respective positions on the role of appellate review at the WTO.291 
As with most investor-state arbitration proceedings, appeals from investor-
state arbitrations under an E.U.-U.S. IIA would require an administering 
institution to implement, oversee, and support appellate proceedings. In an 
E.U.-U.S. IIA, ICSID is the most logical institution in which to lodge an 
appellate mechanism for three reasons, all of which relate to ICSID’s expertise 
and legitimacy in international investment law. First, ICSID is a well-respected 
multilateral institution that has already administered over *&& investor-state 
 
287 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. (UNCITRAL), Possible Reform of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Appellate and Multilateral Court Mechanisms, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.$/WG.III/WP.!#', ¶ % & n.( (Jan. "&-"(, "&"&) (“The suggestion for the establishment of 
an appellate mechanism is contained in various proposals submitted by Governments . . . .”). 
288 See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS. SECRETARIAT, POSSIBLE 
IMPROVEMENTS OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR ICSID ARBITRATION ¶¶ "&-"* & annex ("&&() 
(noting than a common appeals mechanism would serve e,ciency, economy, coherence, and 
consistency, and setting out the features of an appeals mechanism). 
289 But see Barton Legum, Appellate Mechanisms for Investment Arbitration: Worth a Second Look 
for the Trans-Paci%c Partnership and the Proposed EU-US FTA? in RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (*), (*$-(" (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., "&!') 
(reasoning that the signi+cant volume of bilateral FDI between the European Union and United 
States might justify the inclusion of an appellate mechanism in an E.U.-U.S. IIA, but not proposing 
the design of such a mechanism); but cf. Ana M. Lopez-Rodriguez, It Takes Two to Tango: Regional 
Investment Treaties and Investor Protection on Both Sides of the Atlantic, " EUR. INV. L. & ARB. REV. 
(!", (("-(* ("&!)) (analyzing U.S. and E.U. positions on ISDS in T-TIP in "&!), including the 
positions of civil society and di-erent governmental actors on both sides of the Atlantic, but not 
proposing a structure for an investment chapter in an E.U.-U.S. FTA). 
290 To be clear, at least two articles have examined the WTO’s Appellate Body as a model for an 
appellate mechanism for international investment law. See Mark Huber & Greg Terpak, The WTO 
Appellate Body: Viability as a Model for Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism, *" ICSID REV. '(', 
'(' ("&!)); van den Broek & Morris, supra note "'(, at *'-#$. Presumably because both articles were 
published in "&!), however, neither examined the viability of modeling an ISDS appeals mechanism on 
the WTO’s Appellate Body in light of the United States’ recent, assiduous criticism of the Appellate 
Body, culminating in the Appellate Body’s collapse, as discussed in supra Section I.C. 
291 See supra subsection I.C.(. 
!%)& University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !'#: !"(# 
disputes292 and over one hundred annulment proceedings.293 Indeed, it is the 
only arbitral institution devoted exclusively to investor-state arbitration.294 It 
also has a Secretariat comprising roughly seventy staff members.295  
Second, Article !%(!) of the ICSID Convention already authorizes each 
ICSID Member State to nominate four arbitrators to ICSID’s Panel of 
Arbitrators, from which parties to a dispute can choose in appointing 
arbitrators,296 and from which the Chair of ICSID’s Administrative Council 
must choose when he or she needs to appoint tribunal chairs297 or annulment 
committees.298 Thus, with respect to this Comment’s proposed appellate 
mechanism, ICSID has a model on which to build in determining how to 
develop a pool of adjudicators from which the parties, or the Chair of the 
Administrative Council if necessary, can draw in composing an appellate 
tribunal to hear a given appeal. 
 
292 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS ) 
("&"&) (“As of June *&, "&"&, ICSID had registered )%# cases under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules.”). 
293 Id. at !% chart !". I calculated the total number of ICSID-administered annulment 
proceedings by adding together the “Number of decisions rejecting the application for annulment,” 
the “Number of decisions annulling the award in part or in full,” and the “Number of annulment 
proceedings discontinued.” 
294 Other international arbitration institutions, administer both investor-state arbitration 
disputes and international commercial arbitration disputes, such as the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce, or administer both investor-state and other public international law disputes, such as 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Compare Dispute Resolution Services, ARB. INST. OF THE 
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COM. https://sccinstitute.com/our-services [https://perma.cc/KB$P-
'RAF] (providing dispute resolution services to “Swedish and international parties” and business 
communities), with Dispute Resolution Services, PERMANENT CT. OF ARB., https://pca-
cpa.org/en/services [https://perma.cc/G)SQ-ASXG] (“The PCA provides administrative support in 
international arbitrations involving various combinations of states, state entities, international 
organizations and private parties.”); see also Albert Jan van den Berg, Appeal Mechanism for ISDS 
Awards: Interaction with the New York and ICSID Conventions, *( ICSID REV. !'%, !## ("&!$) (“If an 
appeal mechanism is to be established, it seems that the ICSID Convention is the preferred legal 
platform for building the mechanism, mainly because it is a treaty dedicated to investment 
arbitration and does not involve supervision and interference by national courts in enforcement and 
setting aside proceedings.”). 
295 Secretariat—Overview, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/secretariat [https://perma.cc/M(F*-$X)F]. 
296 ICSID Convention, supra note ', arts. !*(!), (&. 
297 See id. art. (&(!) (“Arbitrators may be appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators, 
except in the case of appointments by the Chairman pursuant to Article *#.”); id. art. *# (providing 
that the Chairman of the Administrative Council will select a tribunal president when the parties 
cannot agree on one); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) ( (providing the procedure for the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council to appoint the president of a tribunal when parties to the 
arbitration cannot agree on the president). 
298 ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. '"(*) (“On receipt of the request [for annulment] the 
Chairman shall forthwith appoint from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons.”). 
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Third, ICSID already serves as the Secretariat for disputes that arise 
under the European Union’s IIAs that include the Investment Court 
System,299 and investors bringing ISDS claims under the USMCA may select 
ICSID as an administering authority.300 Thus, the prospect of adding an 
appellate mechanism to ICSID is not a quantum leap from the current E.U. 
and U.S. ISDS positions, as re/ected in their recently concluded IIAs and 
model negotiating texts. 
The mechanics of establishing an appellate mechanism at ICSID to which 
disputes arising out of an E.U.-U.S. IIA could be appealed would involve 
initiatives on at least three fronts, which are described below. 
i. The Opt-In Appellate Instrument Establishing the Appellate Mechanism 
at ICSID 
First, the European Union and United States would work with ICSID to 
develop a new, opt-in legal instrument enabling parties to appeal investor-
state disputes that were originally administered by ICSID. Creating an opt-
in legal instrument is a more pragmatic option than amending the ICSID 
Convention, which requires the unanimous consent of all ICSID Member 
States.301 The creation of an opt-in instrument, by contrast, would require 
only the parties opting into the instrument to ratify it and would technically 
involve a modi.cation of the ICSID Convention between the states ratifying 
the instrument.302 Indeed, because the opt-in instrument would not require 
an amendment of the ICSID Convention,303 the mechanism could begin 
 
299 INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS., ANNUAL REPORT * ("&!#) (“We are very 
pleased that ICSID has been named as the Secretariat for the investment dispute settlement 
mechanisms in the recent agreements between the European Union, and Canada, Mexico and 
Singapore, respectively, and look forward to supporting other States in such endeavors.”). 
300 USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.D.*.((a)-(b). 
301 ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. %%(!) (providing that an amendment shall become 
e-ective only after “all Contracting States have rati+ed, accepted or approved the amendment”). 
302 See, e.g., van den Berg, supra note "$(, at !)& (reasoning that an instrument allowing ICSID 
members to modify the Convention between them would not contravene Article (!(!)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which governs the modi+cation of multilateral treaties 
by certain parties); INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPS., supra note "##, annex ¶ " (assuming 
that the submission of an award to an appellate mechanism is “based on the provisions of a treaty,” 
then the treaty providing for the ICSID appellate mechanism could “modify the ICSID Convention 
to the extent required, as between the States parties to that treaty”). 
303 At least one scholar disagrees that such an instrument would be consistent with ICSID. See 
N. Jansen Calamita, The (In)Compatibility of Appellate Mechanisms with Existing Instruments of the 
Investment Treaty Regime, !# J. WORLD INV. & TRADE '#', %&(—!* ("&!)). Calamita argues that an 
appellate mechanism is incompatible with the ICSID Convention, because Article (! of the Vienna 
Convention permits the modi+cation of a treaty if, and only if, the treaty expressly permits such a 
modi+cation or does not prohibit such a modi+cation. Id. at %&%-&). Further, Calamita emphasizes that 
Article '*(!) of the ICSID Convention provides that an “award [issued in an arbitration 
administered by ICSID] shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any 
 
!%)" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !'#: !"(# 
operating with just the European Union and United States as parties, and 
allow other states to join the instrument over time. 
The opt-in instrument would need to cover several core issues. First, it 
would need to address whether, in the case of bifurcated proceedings, 
jurisdictional awards could be appealed, or whether only awards on the merits 
could be appealed.304 Because jurisdictional awards can dispose entirely of an 
investor-state proceeding, this Comment argues that jurisdictional awards 
should be appealable, just as jurisdictional awards may be annulled under the 
ICSID Convention.305 
Second, the instrument would need to provide the grounds of review on 
appeal and the actions that an appellate tribunal could take with respect to a 
given appeal. CETA empowers the Appellate Tribunal constituted under that 
treaty’s Investment Court System to uphold, modify, or reverse .rst-instance 
 
other remedy except those provided for in this Convention.” Id. at %&#. As van den Berg explains, however, 
neither Article '* nor any other article of the ICSID Convention prohibits the parties from modifying 
the ICSID Convention within the meaning of Article (!(!)(b) of the Vienna Convention. Van den 
Berg, supra note "$(, at !)&. For the modi+cation to be valid under Article (!(!)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention, the modi+cation must (i) “not a-ect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights 
under the treaty or the performance of their obligations” and (ii) “not relate to a provision, 
derogation from which is incompatible with the e-ective execution of the object and purpose of the 
treaty as a whole.” VCLT, supra note !'$, art. (!(!)(b). A modi+cation of ICSID Convention Article 
'* to allow for the appeal of an ICSID award satis+es these criteria because other parties’ rights 
would not be prejudiced by the appeal of an award between two parties, and because the appeal of 
an award is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention, as the appeal 
would still result in a +nal award and “may actually increase the legitimacy of ISDS”). Van den Berg, 
supra note "#", at !)&. 
304 In international arbitration, institutional rules will often permit tribunals to bifurcate a 
proceeding into a jurisdictional phase and a merits phase. See, e.g., International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration 
Rules) (!(() (explaining that tribunals may determine whether to decide jurisdictional objections as 
preliminary questions—that is, to bifurcate the jurisdictional objections—or to join the jurisdictional 
objections to the merits of the arbitration). The bifurcation of a dispute may enable the tribunal to 
exercise judicial economy, as a valid jurisdictional objection would obviate the need for the merits 
phase of the arbitration. See Marinn Carlson & Patrick Childress, Bifurcation in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, in THE INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION REVIEW (#, '& (Barton Legum ed., (th 
ed. "&!$) (“Procedural e,ciency—whether bifurcation is more likely to increase or decrease the time 
and costs associated with the arbitration—is the overarching factor that tribunals consider when 
deciding bifurcation applications.”). 
305 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) '" (referring to the right of either party to an ICSID-
administered arbitration to request annulment of “an award,” without qualifying the type of award for 
which the request may be submitted); Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. & Indalsa Perú, S.A. v. 
The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/&*/(, Decision on Annulment, ¶ !*& (Sept. ', "&&)), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita&")).pdf [https://perma.cc/NBP)-
HQHR] (reviewing and denying an application for the annulment of an award issued by a tribunal 
that declined jurisdiction over the investor’s claim). 
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tribunal legal conclusions,306 which mirrors the power given to the WTO’s 
Appellate Body307 and appears sensible for the purpose of this Comment’s 
proposed structure. More controversial is CETA’s empowerment of its 
Appellate Tribunal to uphold, modify, or reverse “manifest errors in the 
appreciation of the facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic 
law,”308 an authority not explicitly granted to the WTO’s Appellate Body—
and that the United States insists is not implicitly granted to it.309 Thus, to 
gain U.S. approval, the appellate instrument should not empower appellate 
tribunals constituted under the ICSID appellate mechanism to review 
“manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts.” Finally, to gain U.S. 
endorsement, the appellate instrument should provide that, although 
appellate decisions might serve as persuasive authority in future disputes, 
they would not bind future ad hoc or appellate tribunals to follow their 
interpretations of the same legal issues. More speci.cally, to placate the 
United States, such a provision should ensure that the appellate mechanism 
would not reincarnate the WTO’s Appellate Body’s emphasis on creating a 
de facto system of precedent.310 Such a provision might read as follows: 
Under this instrument, appellate decisions interpreting a provision of a 
covered treaty shall not bind future appellate or ad hoc tribunals interpreting 
the same provision of the same treaty. The treaty parties reserve the exclusive 
right to adopt binding interpretations of the covered treaty’s provisions. For 
the avoidance of doubt, however, appellate interpretations of a given treaty’s 
provisions may be relied on as persuasive authority in subsequent disputes 
arising under that treaty.311 
 
306 CETA, supra note !(, art. #."#."(a) (“The Appellate Tribunal may uphold, modify or reverse 
a Tribunal’s award based on: (a) errors in the application or interpretation of applicable law . . . .”). 
307 See DSU, supra note "!%, art. !).!* (“The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse 
the legal +ndings and conclusions of the panel.”). 
308 CETA, supra note !(, art. #."#."(b). 
309 REPORT ON THE APPELLATE BODY, supra note "!', at *# (“WTO Members agreed in the 
DSU to expressly limit the authority of the Appellate Body to review a panel’s legal +ndings, not 
its factual +ndings. Indeed, it is di,cult to see how the language of Article !).% of the DSU could 
be clearer on this point . . . .”). 
310 See supra subsection I.C.( (explaining the U.S. criticism that the Appellate Body 
unjusti+ably created a system of de facto stare decisis). 
311 As explained in subsection I.C.(, the United States endorses citing prior WTO Appellate 
Body reports as persuasive, not mandatory, authority. The proposed language here resembles 
existing language in the "&!" Model BIT that applies to ad hoc tribunals, which provides: “An award 
made by a tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect 
of the particular case.” "&!" U.S. Model BIT, supra note "', art. *(.(. 
!%)) University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. !'#: !"(# 
ii. The Pool of Appellate Adjudicators 
On the second front necessary to enable the appeal of investor-state 
disputes arising out of an E.U.-U.S. IIA, ICSID would need to establish a 
body of adjudicators available to hear disputes appealed to the appellate 
mechanism. The procedure for selecting these adjudicators could borrow 
from the process and criteria that ICSID uses when the Chair of the 
Administrative Council designates arbitrators to serve on the Panel of 
Arbitrators.312 For example, the Chair of the Administrative Council could 
designate adjudicators to serve on an appeals mechanism roster, with a 
mandate to ensure that those adjudicators each had demonstrated expertise 
in international investment law and collectively constituted a diverse group, 
measured across dimensions such as gender, geography, and race.313 Having 
the Chair of the Administrative Council establish the roster of adjudicators 
available to hear appeals would enhance the legitimacy of the appellate 
system, because it would de/ect criticisms that the pool was being stacked 
with pro-investor or pro-state adjudicators. At the same time, however, each 
investor and state litigant in a particular dispute would be able to nominate 
an adjudicator from that pool to hear the appeal, ensuring that the appellate 
system would maintain the principle of neutrality throughout the arbitration’s 
proceeding, and thus avoiding the risk of politicizing the dispute. As with 
ICSID-administered ad hoc arbitration proceedings, if the parties failed to 
agree on the appellate tribunal president, the Chair of the Administrative 
Council would appoint the tribunal president.314 
iii. The E.U.-U.S. IIA Language 
The third front of developing the E.U.-U.S. IIA appellate procedure 
would involve drafting treaty language enabling investors to submit ISDS 
disputes to ICSID’s appellate mechanism. Speci.cally, the E.U.-U.S. IIA 
would require that ad hoc arbitrations arising under the IIA be administered 
exclusively by ICSID and restrict appeal of those arbitrations only to the 
ICSID appellate mechanism. Creating such a procedure would not mark a 
dramatic departure from the structure of the "&!" U.S. Model BIT or the 
 
312 ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. !*(") (“The Chairman may designate ten persons to 
each [of the Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators.] The persons so designated to a 
Panel shall each have a di-erent nationality.”). 
313 See, e.g., UNCITRAL, supra note "#), ¶ '% (“Mechanisms should be used to ensure both 
geographical and gender diversity.”). 
314 See ICSID Convention, supra note ', art. *# (explaining that if the parties to an ad hoc 
arbitration do not agree on the composition of a tribunal within ninety days after ICSID has registered 
the request for arbitration, the Administrative Council Chair shall complete the tribunal’s composition). 
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IIAs that the European Union has recently concluded that include the 
Investment Court System. 
Consider the "&!" Model BIT first. Article "(.!& of the "&!" Model BIT 
provides the following: “In the event that an appellate mechanism for 
reviewing awards rendered by investor-State dispute settlement tribunals is 
developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, the Parties 
shall consider whether awards rendered under Article %) should be subject to 
that appellate mechanism.”315 Article %), in turn, addresses the remedies that 
arbitral awards may provide and the mechanics of enforcing an award. Article 
%).'(a) provides that disputing parties may not seek to enforce an ICSID award 
until !"& days from when the award was rendered or, if applicable, the date 
when annulment proceedings have completed.316 Given Article "(’s explicit 
contemplation of an appellate mechanism being created and affecting Article 
%), Article %) should be amended to provide that disputing parties cannot seek 
to enforce an award issued by an ad hoc tribunal until both the disputing parties 
have waived their rights to appeal the award, or, if one party has appealed the 
award, until the appellate tribunal has issued a final decision on the award.317 
Next consider the European Union’s current IIA model, as exempli.ed by 
CETA. CETA Article (."( addresses the establishment of an Appellate 
Tribunal, as supported by the CETA Joint Committee,318 which comprises 
representatives from Canada and the European Union.319 That article could 
easily be amended to provide for an appellate mechanism that is instead 
supported and managed by ICSID, not the CETA Joint Committee. Indeed, 
CETA already provides for ICSID to serve as the Secretariat for .rst-
instance tribunals under its Investment Court System.320 
How the text in CETA and the U.S. Model BIT would be merged in an 
E.U.-U.S. IIA is beyond the scope of this Comment; the point is that the 
United States and European Union have treaty language that could be 
modi.ed to permit disputing parties to submit appeals to an appellate 
mechanism within ICSID. 
 
315 "&!" U.S. Model BIT, supra note "', art. "#.!&. 
316 Id. art *%.((a). 
317 Id. art. "#.!&. Under Article *(, exhaustion of an appellate right would presumably mean 
the issuance of a decision by an appellate tribunal constituted under ICSID’s appellate mechanism. 
318 See CETA, supra note !(, art. #."#.) (“The CETA Joint Committee shall promptly adopt a 
decision setting out the following administrative and organisational matters regarding the 
functioning of the Appellate Tribunal . . . .”). 
319 CETA, supra note !(, art. "%.!.! (“The Parties hereby establish the CETA Joint Committee 
comprising representatives of the European Union and representatives of Canada. The CETA Joint 
Committee shall be co-chaired by the Minister for International Trade of Canada and the Member 
of the European Commission responsible for Trade, or their respective designees.”). 
320 Id. art. #.").!% (“The ICSID Secretariat shall act as Secretariat for the Tribunal and provide 
it with appropriate support.”). 
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iv. The Appellate Mechanism Illustrated 
To illustrate how this system would work, suppose that an E.U. investor 
initiated investor-state arbitration against the United States and selected 
ICSID as the arbitral institution to administer the ad hoc arbitration. 
Suppose, further, that the ad hoc tribunal issued an award, and that award 
contained what either the United States or the investor perceived was a legal 
error. The party claiming a legal error would then invoke the ICSID appellate 
instrument and the pertinent provisions of the E.U.-U.S. IIA, specify the 
legal grounds on which it believed the ad hoc tribunal erred, and submit a 
request for appellate review to ICSID.321 The parties would then select 
adjudicators from the ICSID-managed roster of appellate adjudicators. 
Those adjudicators would constitute the appellate tribunal, which would 
review the claimed legal errors and issue a .nal, binding, non-reviewable 
decision to the parties on those legal issues. The original award, as modi.ed 
by the appellate tribunal’s legal conclusions, would then be enforceable. 
". Substantive Provisions 
The second main criticism leveled against international investment law is 
that IIAs’ substantive standards—the provisions creating protections for 
foreign investors and obligations for host states—undermine states’ right to 
regulate.322 More speci.cally, critics argue that broadly de.ned investment 
protection standards in IIAs deter states from enacting certain public policy 
measures out of fear that foreign investors will challenge those measures as 
breaching a pertinent IIA’s substantive obligations.323 An IIA between the 
European Union and the United States therefore presents an opportunity to 
establish precise substantive standards that simultaneously provide more ex 
ante certainty about the scope of those standards and preserve states’ 
regulatory space. 
 
321 To prevent disputing parties from unnecessarily delaying the resolution of the dispute, the 
IIA would prevent the United States, the European Union, and their investors from seeking the 
annulment of an award. In other words, the IIA would force disputing parties to raise all their legal 
claims in one appeal. 
322 See, e.g., Colin Brown, Deputy Head of Unit, Disp. Settlement & Legal Aspects of Trade Pol’y, 
Directorate General for Trade, Eur. Comm’n, The European Union’s Approach to Dispute Settlement * 
(June "", "&!#), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/"&!#/july/tradoc_!')!!".pdf [https://perma.cc
/E%XD-M#S$] (“Much of the criticism of the investment protection and ISDS system comes from the 
concern that it is a system which impacts and limits genuine regulatory activities.”). 
323 See, e.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: UNCTAD 
SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II, at xiii, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/"&!!/', U.N. Sales No. E.!!.II.D.!' ("&!") (“[T]he application of [investment 
protection] provisions has brought to light the need to balance investment protection with 
competing policy objectives of the host State, and in particular, with its right to regulate in the 
public interest.”). 
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This Comment uses the most controversial and expansive substantive 
standard—fair and equitable treatment324—as an example of how the 
European Union and United States should reconcile their positions on core 
substantive provisions in an IIA. Although the FET standard’s wording 
varies by treaty, its basic content remains the same: to provide fair and 
equitable treatment to investments made by investors of the treaty’s 
counterparty.325 For example, CETA provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord 
in its territory to covered investments of the other Party and to investors with 
respect to their covered investments fair and equitable treatment.”326 
Similarly, the USMCA provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord to covered 
investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, 
including fair and equitable treatment.”327 Nonetheless, the treaties diverge 
on how that general standard is further de.ned; this Comment proposes a 
reconciliation of those positions. 
a. E.U. and U.S. Formulations of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
Existing International Investment Agreements 
Although the United States and the European Union share concerns about 
expansive interpretations of the FET standard, they have taken di,erent 
approaches to narrowing its scope. The European Union has attempted to 
clarify and tighten the standard by including a “closed list” of su+cient 
conditions for a FET breach.328 For example, CETA Article (.!&." provides: 
 
324 See, e.g., id. at ! (“The fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard is a key element in 
contemporary international investment agreements (IIAs). Over the years, it has emerged as the 
most relied upon and successful basis for IIA claims by investors.”). Therefore, the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development has expressed concern “that the FET standard may be applied in 
investor-State arbitration to restrict host-country administrative and governmental action to a 
degree that threatens the policymaking autonomy of that country.” Id.; see also Sykes, supra note *&, 
at '"$ (“The exact phrasing of the [FET] obligation varies [across IIAs], but it inevitably exhibits 
considerable vagueness.”). 
325 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note *"*, at xiii (“[M]any tribunals have 
interpreted [FET provisions] broadly to include a variety of speci+c requirements including a State’s 
obligation to act consistently, transparently, reasonably, without ambiguity, arbitrariness or 
discrimination, in an evenhanded manner, to ensure due process in decision-making and respect 
investors’ legitimate expectations.”). 
326 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.!&.!. 
327 USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.%.!. 
328 See, e.g., Council Meeting Document DS !)((/!", EU Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement—Landing Zones $ (Nov. %, "&!"), https://www.lapresse.ca/html/
!%**/Document_UE_".pdf [https://perma.cc/("JU-JQ*M] (noting that a “possible solution” to the 
European Union’s reluctance to tie the FET standard to customary international law “could be to spell 
out the criteria for [the FET standard’s] application, thereby codifying a generally accepted outcome 
of jurisprudence that both sides are comfortable with”); SIMON LESTER & BRYAN MERCURIO, 
SAFEGUARDING POLICY SPACE IN INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS * ("&!)), https://www.cato.org/
sites/cato.org/files/articles/lester-mercurio-iiel-issue-brief-december-"&!).pdf [https://perma.cc/
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A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment . . . if a measure 
or series of measures constitutes: 
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of 
transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings; 
(c) manifest arbitrariness; 
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race 
or religious belief; 
(e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or 
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph ! of this Article.329 
 
In other words, CETA’s FET standard provides .ve independent grounds 
on which state measures may breach the FET standard, as well as the option 
to add to that set of grounds. These grounds require egregious state conduct 
to constitute a breach, as indicated by the adjectives “fundamental,” 
“manifest,” “targeted,” and “abusive,” and therefore establish a high standard 
for a breach to occur.330 At the same time, they provide a measure of certainty 
about what conduct will breach the FET standard, which advantages 
investors and states alike. 
By contrast, U.S. IIAs provide simply that the FET standard means the 
minimum standard of treatment guaranteed to aliens under customary 
international law.331 U.S. IIAs explain that, under customary international 
law, the FET obligation “includes the obligation not to deny justice in 
criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with 
the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the 
world.”332 Unlike CETA, however, neither the "&!" U.S. Model BIT nor the 
USCMA’s investment chapter provides additional guidance about what host-
state conduct breaches the FET standard.333 
 
YW(K-AZ$S] (“[T]he most recent EU investment agreements offer more specific details on the 
scope and meaning of FET than do past agreements.”). 
329 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.!&.". 
330 See Sykes, supra note *&, at '*". 
331 See, e.g., USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.%.! (“Each Party shall accord to covered 
investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.”). 
332 "&!" U.S. Model BIT, supra note "', art. '."(a); see also USMCA, supra note !$'. art. !(.%."(a) 
(“‘Fair and equitable treatment’ includes the obligation not to deny justice . . . in accordance with the 
principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world . . . .”). 
333 Cf. UMSCA, supra note !$', art. !(.%." (providing only that this provision “prescribes the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the standard of treatment 
to be a-orded to covered investments” without providing more speci+c guidance). 
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The CETA FET standard also diverges from the USMCA FET standard 
in that it incorporates the “legitimate expectations” principle, which is often 
viewed as forming a component of the FET standard in international 
investment law.334 As a general proposition, the legitimate expectations 
principle protects investors against host-state measures that frustrate their 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations.335 
CETA Article (.!&.) codi.es this principle by providing that, in 
determining whether a respondent has breached the FET standard, a tribunal 
may consider whether the respondent “made a speci.c representation to an 
investor to induce a covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, 
and upon which the investor relied in deciding to make or maintain the 
covered investment, but that the Party subsequently frustrated.”336 In other 
words, in determining whether a host state breached the FET standard, the 
tribunal may account for whether the host state frustrated the investor’s 
legitimate expectations. To some extent, CETA Article (.#." constrains 
Article (.!&.) by providing that the “mere fact” that a host state measure is 
inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not, by itself, breach the 
FET standard.337 Nonetheless, Article (.!&.) plays an important role in 
CETA’s FET standard because it explicitly recognizes the legitimate 
expectations principle as a factor to consider under the FET standard and 
explains how a tribunal should analyze a legitimate expectations claim.338 
By contrast, the USMCA does not recognize the legitimate expectations 
principle as a factor that tribunals should consider in assessing a breach of the 
FET standard. In language that parallels Article (.#." of CETA, Article 
!).'.) of the USMCA provides that “the mere fact that a Party takes or fails 
to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does 
not constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the 
covered investment as a result.”339 But unlike CETA’s Article (.!&.), the 
USMCA contains no corresponding article that instructs a tribunal on how to 
 
334 See, e.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note *"*, at %* (“Protection of investors’ 
legitimate expectations has been repeatedly identi+ed by arbitral tribunals as a key element of the 
FET standard.”). 
335 See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES § ).!)$ ("&!)) (“The 
doctrine of legitimate expectations is concerned with due process in administrative decision-making: 
ensuring the consistent application of the law and enforcing representations by the host State when 
these were made speci+cally enough to the particular investor to justify reliance.”). 
336 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.!&.(. 
337 Id. art. #.$.". 
338 See id. art. #.!&.(. 
339 USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.%.(. 
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account for or evaluate an investor’s expectations created by a speci.c 
government representation to that investor.340 
b. The Formulation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard the European 
Union and United States Should Include in an E.U.-U.S. IIA 
To maximize an E.U.-U.S. IIA’s contribution to the legitimacy of 
international investment law and the predictability of transatlantic 
investment, its FET standard should (!) prescribe the conditions that 
constitute a breach of the FET standard, (") incorporate the legitimate 
expectations principle, and (%) subject the FET standard to a general 
exceptions article that prescribes the conditions excusing a breach of the FET 
standard on public policy grounds. These proposed elements of the E.U.-U.S. 
IIA are explained in turn below. 
i. Prescribing the Su+cient Conditions for a FET Breach 
The European Union’s formulation of the FET standard—prescribing the 
sufficient conditions for a FET breach341—should serve as the basis for the E.U.-
U.S. IIA’s FET standard for two reasons. First, an FET standard describing the 
circumstances that breach the standard would enable both parties to more 
confidently craft FET-consistent public policy measures. Second, it would 
create more ex ante certainty about the types of FET claims likely to prevail, 
which should result in efficiency gains for investors and states alike. 
By contrast, the USMCA’s linkage of its FET standard to the minimum 
standard of treatment under customary international law provides little ex 
ante certainty to investors and states about what state conduct will breach 
that standard.342 While most investor-state arbitration participants and 
 
340 See id.; cf. Patrick Dumberry, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER 
THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT (CETA) $', !&) (Makane Moïse 
Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer eds., "&!$) (“The CETA parties therefore did not follow the more 
radical option adopted in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) explicitly excluding legitimate expectations 
from the obligations covered by the FET clause.”). The legitimate expectations provision in the TPP—
since rebranded as the CPTPP—matches the legitimate expectations provision in the USMCA. Compare 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) art. $.%.(, Mar. #, 
"&!#, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trade-agreements/TPP/Text-ENGLISH/$.-Investment-
Chapter.pdf [https://perma.cc/'JYN-R"X*] (“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes or 
fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not constitute a breach 
of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.”), with USMCA, 
supra note !$', art. !(.%.( (same). 
341 See supra subsection I.B.( (explaining how CETA operates, including how the FET 
provision of CETA functions); supra subsection II.B.".a (comparing the E.U. and U.S. formulations 
of the FET standard). 
342 See, e.g., ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States of America, Case No. ARB(AF)/&&/!, Post-
Hearing Submission, at * (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June "), "&&"), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-documents/italaw#%&".pdf [https://perma.cc/YJV'-
 
"&"!] T-TIP Negotiations Round Two !%$! 
commentators agree that customary international law guarantees a minimum 
standard of treatment, “what remains controversial is to determine the actual 
content of that standard.”343 Similarly, UNCTAD has criticized the U.S. IIA 
link between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment on 
the ground that “the minimum standard itself is highly indeterminate [and] 
lacks a clearly de.ned content.”344 An FET standard linked to the minimum 
standard of treatment therefore does not provide much clarity on the 
resolution of particular investment disputes, as the minimum standard of 
treatment “is a concept that does not o,er ready-made solutions for deciding 
modern investment disputes; at best, it gives a rough idea of a high threshold 
that the challenged governmental conduct has to meet for a breach to be 
established.”345 For example, although the USMCA provides that the FET 
obligation under the minimum standard of treatment includes the obligation 
not to deny justice “in accordance with the principle of due process embodied 
in the principal legal systems of the world,”346 this broad language does not 
illuminate the circumstances that will result in a denial of justice, or that will 
otherwise breach the FET standard.347 
Indeed, tribunals have routinely struggled with how to interpret the FET 
standard under U.S. IIAs tying FET to the minimum standard of treatment, 
especially given that the minimum standard of treatment developed in the 
early twentieth century.348 For example, the tribunal in Mondev v. United 
States reasoned that FET under customary international law must re/ect “the 
evolutionary character of international law” and, in the context of a modern 
investor-state dispute, could not refer to the standard espoused by the 
Mexican Claims Commission in the !#"' United States Neer v. Mexico case—
the case to which the minimum standard of treatment is often traced.349 
 
GQNW] (“The rules encompassed within the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment are speci+c ones that address particular contexts. There is no single standard applicable 
to all contexts.” (internal citations omitted)). 
343 DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § !.&![E]. 
344 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note *"*, at "#. 
345 Id. at (%. 
346 USCMA, supra note !$', art. !(.%."(a). 
347 See DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § !.&![E] (“The "&!" UNCTAD report merely indicates that 
‘[the minimum standard of treatment] is often understood as a broad concept intended to encompass 
the doctrine of denial of justice along with other aspects of the law of State responsibility for injuries 
to aliens.’”) (quoting U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., supra note *"*, at ((). 
348 See id. § !.&![A] (“Despite a strong opposition by many States, the early twentieth century 
nevertheless saw the gradual emergence of a minimum standard of treatment.”). 
349 Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/$$/", Award, 
¶¶ !!(-!%, !!$ (Oct. !!, "&&"), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-documents/ita!&)%.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SR#U-D(JX]; DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § !.&![B] (“The Neer case has had 
considerable in.uence on the emergence of the concept of a minimum standard of treatment.”). The 
tribunal in the Neer case reasoned that for the international minimum standard of treatment 
accorded to aliens to be breached, the host state’s actions needed to “amount to an outrage, to bad 
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Instead, according to the Mondev tribunal, NAFTA’s FET standard must 
“incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by the 
conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral investment treaties.”350 In 
other words, since the minimum standard of treatment was expounded in the 
early twentieth century, its content must have evolved.351 
But tribunals have struggled to determine the minimum standard’s precise 
contemporary content—that is, how the minimum standard of treatment has 
evolved. Recently, NAFTA tribunals have followed an approach that 
acknowledges that NAFTA’s provision containing the FET standard, Article 
!!&$(!), refers to the minimum standard but then frames the minimum 
standard by reference to how prior NAFTA tribunals have interpreted Article 
!!&$(!).352 In other words, they have not required claimants to adduce 
evidence of widespread state practice and opinio juris—the two elements 
necessary to establish a rule of customary international law353—even though 
claimants in investor-state arbitration bear the burden of establishing the 
content of the minimum standard.354 The tribunal in Windstream Energy LLC 
v. Canada demonstrated why tribunals have followed this approach: 
The Tribunal further agrees with the Respondent that in principle the 
content of a rule of customary international law such as the minimum 
standard of treatment can best be determined on the basis of evidence of 
actual State practice establishing custom that also shows that the States have 
 
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insu,ciency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insu,ciency.” Neer v. United Mexican States, ( R.I.A.A. %&, %!-%" (Gen. Claims Comm’n !$"%). 
350 Mondev, ¶ !"'. 
351 See, e.g., ADF Grp. Inc. v. United States of America, Case No. ARB(AF)/&&/!, Award, ¶ !)$ 
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan. $, "&&*), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita&&&$.pdf [https://perma.cc/J(#R-ZAKX] (“[W]hat customary international law 
projects is not a static photograph of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens as it stood in !$") 
when the Award in the Neer case was rendered.”). 
352 See, e.g., Clayton v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. "&&$-&(, ¶¶ (("-(% (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Mar. !), 
"&!'), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw("!".pdf [https://perma.cc/
J$JB-YLQ*] (embracing the interpretation of Article !!&'(!) articulated by the tribunal in Waste 
Management, Inc. v. Mexico, that the minimum standard is breached by “conduct [that] is arbitrary, grossly 
unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice, or 
involves a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety”) (quoting Waste Mgmt., 
Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)&&/*, Award, ¶¶ $#-$$ (Apr. *&, "&&(), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita&$&&.pdf [https://perma.cc/G)F$-XCFX]). 
353 See, e.g., USMCA, supra note !$', annex !(-A (defining customary international law with 
these two elements). 
354 See PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE FORMATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW *$ ("&!%) (“One of the basic 
principles of international law is that the burden of proving . . . a rule of customary international 
law rests on the party that alleges it. . . . Investor-State arbitration tribunals have also held that a 
customary rule needs to be proven by the party that alleges it.”). 
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accepted such practice as law (opinio juris). However, the Tribunal notes that 
neither Party has produced such evidence in this arbitration. In the 
circumstances, the Tribunal must rely on other, indirect evidence in order to 
ascertain the content of the customary international law minimum standard 
of treatment; the Tribunal cannot simply declare non liquet. Such indirect 
evidence includes, in the Tribunal’s view, decisions taken by other NAFTA 
tribunals that speci"cally address the issue of interpretation and application 
of Article ##$%(#) of NAFTA, as well as relevant legal scholarship.355 
The Windstream tribunal’s analysis illustrates that disputing parties rarely 
undertake the monumental task of adducing the evidence of (!) widespread 
state practice and (") opinio juris necessary to establish the content of the 
minimum standard of treatment under customary international law; instead, 
they tend to rely on prior tribunals’ interpretations of the standard, NAFTA 
members’ non-disputing party submissions, restatements, and scholarship.356 
Tribunals then rely on the parties’ brie.ng of the issue to determine the 
minimum standard of treatment’s content, which means that they, too, rely 
on prior tribunals’ interpretation of the standard.357 In turn, there is little ex 
ante certainty about how a given tribunal will decide an FET claim under 
U.S. IIAs, except that the tribunal will likely rely on nonbinding 
jurisprudence to give the minimum standard of treatment content and e,ect. 
By contrast, the closed list of circumstances that will breach the FET 
standard under CETA provides more ex ante certainty about how the 
 
355 Windstream Energy LLC v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. "&!*-"", Award, ¶ *'! (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. Sept. "), "&!%)., https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw)#)'.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S)DW-BPJR]. 
356 Id.; see, e.g., Eli Lily & Co. v. Gov’t of Can., Case No. UNCT/!(/", Claimant’s Memorial, 
¶¶ "'(-%& (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Sept. "$, "&!(), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-
documents/italaw(&(%.pdf [https://perma.cc/C%ZJ-WA(S] (citing prior interpretations by 
“NAFTA and non-NAFTA tribunals” to advance an interpretation of the minimum standard of 
treatment, not by adducing evidence of widespread state practice or opinio juris); Mesa Power Grp., 
LLC v. Gov’t of Can., Memorial of the Investor, ¶¶ **%-(( (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. "&, "&!*), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-documents/italaw*""&.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/$XQN-MKHP] (relying on prior tribunals’ interpretations of the minimum 
standard to reason that “it is not necessary to speci+cally prove the elements of practice and opinio 
juris,” and concluding instead that “[i]nternational tribunal decisions are therefore a primary source 
of content of customary international law”); DUMBERRY, supra note (!, § *.&![A] (“But how have 
tribunals actually used their ‘creative’ role in the context of the FET clause? For the most part, they 
have simply looked at what other tribunals have done in the past.”). 
357 See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, ¶¶ %"*-"% (NAFTA Arb. 
Trib. June #, "&&$) https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/+les/case-documents/ita&*)#.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YN('-DJSD] (reviewing the claimant’s and respondent’s analysis of prior NAFTA 
awards and concluding from that review alone—that is, without identifying widespread state practice 
or opinio juris—that Article !!&' precludes NAFTA parties from treating foreign investors from another 
NAFTA party in “a manifestly arbitrary manner”); DUMBERRY, supra note *'(, at () (“Investment 
tribunals have generally failed in their task of properly revealing the existence of customary rules.”). 
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standard will be interpreted. Moreover, this approach to the FET standard—
de.ning the content of the FET standard more precisely—accords with the 
U.S. view that states should exercise control over the interpretation of 
substantive obligations in their IIAs.358 And CETA’s formulation of the FET 
standard does not tilt the standard in favor of investors: the bar is high for 
investors to establish the existence of any of the circumstances that constitute 
a FET breach under CETA.359 
ii. Codifying the Legitimate Expectations Principle 
Similarly, an E.U.-U.S. IIA should include CETA’s formulation of the 
legitimate expectations principle as a factor that tribunals may consider in 
determining a FET breach. Before explaining why, it is necessary to address 
the importance of including the principle in the E.U.-U.S. IIA in the .rst 
place, especially in light of criticism that the principle infringes states’ 
regulatory sovereignty.360 
The legitimate expectations principle accounts for the fact that host states 
face incentives to renege on speci.c promises they made to induce a foreign 
investment after the foreign investment has been made, often to the 
detriment of the foreign investor.361 Indeed, tribunals have tended to .nd that 
states have frustrated investors’ legitimate expectations when states have 
repudiated speci.c promises to those investors or the industry to which those 
investors belong.362 Thus, when properly de.ned and circumscribed, the 
legitimate expectations principle disciplines states against undermining an 
 
358 U.S. Working Group III Statements, supra note "&%, at !!:&%:"'-!!:!!:&) (“[U]ltimately . . . 
the duty rests on states to ensure the meaning of their . . . treaties, and that’s an important duty that 
[the United States] would not want to necessarily delegate without careful consideration.”). 
359 See Sykes, supra note *&, at '*" (“Thus, if an investor is misled by the host country to [its] 
detriment, it must frame its claim as ‘denial of justice,’ ‘fundamental breach of due process,’ ‘manifest 
arbitrariness,’ or ‘abusive treatment,’ all of which suggest a fairly high standard for the investor to meet.”). 
360 See, e.g., David Gaukrodger, The Balance between Investor Protection and the Right to Regulate 
in Investment Treaties: A Scoping Paper "% (OECD Working Papers on International Investment No. 
"&!)/&", "&!)), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/#")#%#&!-en.pdf?expires0!%!%('"'&!&
id0id&accname0guest&checksum0'(%AEABBA)EC"%'A!(B(AEC&D&)(BBDB [https://
perma.cc/KKM*-TN$P] (“The question of whether and how treaties protect covered investors’ legitimate 
expectations is an important element in many debates about the balance of the right to regulate and 
investor protection.”). 
361 See Sykes, supra note *&, at ($) (“It is widely understood in economics that once such sunk costs 
have been incurred, the stream of returns necessary to recoup them becomes vulnerable to various 
[government] actions that may appropriate all or part of the returns, often termed a ‘holdup problem.’”). 
362 See MCLACHLAN, supra note **', § ).!#$ (“Thus, cases in which tribunals have found the 
host State in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard on the ground of legitimate 
expectations have generally been where the State has made speci+c commitments either to the 
particular investor, or in the context of particular industry.”). 
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investor’s reasonable reliance interests.363 Moreover, under a proper 
formulation of the legitimate expectations principle, “[a]s long as 
governments do not mislead investors about the likelihood of policy change, 
or conceal information that they could easily disclose, there is little basis for 
awarding compensation when investors are disappointed by a change in policy 
that violates no other treaty obligation.”364 
CETA Article (.!&.) provides such a proper formulation of the legitimate 
expectations principle. As described earlier in this subsection, CETA’s 
formulation of the legitimate expectations principle provides that a tribunal, 
in assessing a potential breach of the FET obligation, may consider whether 
(!) the host state provided a speci.c representation to the investor, (") to 
induce that investor’s investment, (%) on which the investor relied to invest, 
and ()) that the host state subsequently frustrated.365 By contrast, the 
USMCA provides only that the “mere fact” that a host state’s actions are 
inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not breach the minimum 
standard.366 Both these formulations provide that an action inconsistent with 
an investor’s expectations does not necessarily amount to a FET breach, but 
the CETA provision provides more clarity because it explains when, and how, 
a tribunal should evaluate an investor’s expectations.367 By contrast, the 
USMCA reference to an investor’s expectations does not provide any 
guidance about whether, or how, a tribunal may factor an investor’s 
expectations into its FET analysis; it states only that frustration of an 
investor’s expectations does not breach the FET standard.368 
Accordingly, CETA’s formulation of the legitimate expectations principle 
should serve as the basis for a legitimate expectations provision in the E.U.-
U.S. IIA. Nevertheless, that provision should be improved to clarify that the 
investor’s reliance on specific representations made to it by the host state must 
be objectively reasonable for a host state to frustrate an investor’s legitimate 
expectations.369 As noted above, the text of CETA Article (.!&.) requires an 
investor only to rely—not to reasonably rely—on a host state’s specific 
 
363 Sykes, supra note *&, at '*& (“Properly circumscribed, this interpretation of the fair and 
equitable treatment principle can respond e-ectively to a key source of ine,cient risk . . . the 
possibility that host countries can exploit conditions of asymmetric information to mislead investors 
about future contingencies.”). 
364 Id. 
365 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.!&.(; supra subsection II.B.".a. 
366 USCMA, supra note !$', art. !(.%.(. 
367 See Dumberry, supra note *(&, at !&# (noting that CETA Article #.!&.( delimits the speci+c 
elements of the legitimate expectations principle). 
368 USMCA, supra note !$', art. !(.%.( (“For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party takes 
or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor’s expectations does not constitute 
a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a result.”). 
369 See DUMBERRY, supra note *(&, at !&# (questioning why CETA omitted a requirement that 
an investor’s reliance must be objectively reasonable to satisfy the legitimate expectations principle). 
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representations for the investor’s legitimate expectations to be frustrated. 
Codifying that the investor’s reliance must be objectively reasonable would 
ensure that the IIA would not protect investors against bad business judgment. 
iii. Providing for General Exceptions that Parallel Those Found in the 
WTO Agreements 
But to fully address ISDS legitimacy concerns, the E.U.-U.S. IIA should 
go further than build on the CETA’s formulation of the FET standard and 
the legitimate expectations principle; it should also provide an analytical 
framework for determining when the pursuit of legitimate policy objectives 
excuses the nonperformance of other treaty obligations, including the 
obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to investments.370 
The IIA should incorporate such a framework for two reasons. First, 
linking the E.U.-U.S. IIA to the WTO agreements more tightly should help 
neuter the specious argument that IIAs uniquely constrain host-state 
policymaking: under the DSU, the WTO’s DSB can require WTO Members 
to repeal domestic legislative or regulatory measures or else face 
countermeasures,371 whereas IIAs do not.372 The WTO has not attracted 
comparable scrutiny on this basis in recent years, even though, through the 
adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports .nding breaches of the WTO 
 
370 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., UNCTAD’S REFORM PACKAGE FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME*#-(" ("&!#) (describing various potential public policy 
and national security exceptions to IIA provisions). 
371 Remedies in WTO dispute settlement require o-ending members to modify their domestic 
regulations or legislation to bring them into compliance with their WTO obligations, or else face 
retaliation through the suspension of trade concessions. See DSU, supra note "!%, art. !$.! (“Where 
a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it 
shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that 
agreement.”); id. art. !%.( (footnote omitted) (“Within %& days after the date of circulation of a panel 
report to the Members, the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting unless a party [appeals the 
panel’s report] or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.”); id. art. !).!( (“An 
Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to 
the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within *& 
days following its circulation to the Members.”); id. art. "! (providing for surveillance measures and 
compliance proceedings to monitor whether o-ending Member States have modi+ed their laws or 
regulations to conform to the WTO agreements); id. art. "" (establishing that if an o-ending WTO 
Member State “fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance 
or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time,” 
then the o-ended WTO Member State may seek compensation from the o-ending Member State 
or seek authorization from the DSB to impose countermeasures (emphasis added)); see also van den 
Broek & Morris, supra note "'(, at %* (explaining that if WTO Member States fail to comply with 
+ndings that they have breached their WTO obligations, the o-ended members may receive 
authorization to impose retaliatory trade sanctions). 
372 See, e.g., CETA, supra note !(, art. #.*$.! (providing that the tribunals constituted under 
the treaty’s Investment Court System may only award monetary damages or “restitution of 
property” as a remedy for treaty breaches). 
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agreements, the DSB has directed WTO Members to repeal sovereign 
measures that infringed their WTO obligations.373 
Second, the WTO agreements provide a logical framework for evaluating 
when public policy measures excuse performance of other treaty obligations. 
Although di,erent WTO agreements o,er slightly di,erent formulations of 
this framework, they all provide that a Member State measure that genuinely 
contributes to a legitimate public policy objective may excuse noncompliance 
with another provision of the relevant agreement, provided that the measure 
is necessary to achieve that objective and that the measure does not otherwise 
“constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti.able discrimination.”374 For 
example, Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) provides, in relevant part, the following: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti"able discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or] 
 
373 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, ¶ 
#.(, WTO Doc. WT/DS'!&/R (adopted June "), "&!$) (finding that ten different U.S. state renewable 
energy measures, passed by seven different states, were inconsistent with the United States’ obligations 
under Article III:( of the GATT !$$(). To be clear, the United States has consistently protested panel and 
Appellate Body reports finding that U.S. trade remedy laws and regulations have breached the WTO’s 
Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. See, e.g., Press 
Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Rejects WTO Dispute Report Shielding 
Canada’s Harmful Lumber Subsidies (Aug. "(, "&"&), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/"&"&/august/united-states-rejects-wto-dispute-report-shielding-canadas-harmful-
lumber-subsidies [https://perma.cc/W%('-%KFX] (quoting Ambassador Lighthizer as saying that the 
panel’s finding in United States—Softwood Lumber VII, see Panel Report, United States—Countervailing 
Measures on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS'**/R (adopted Aug. "(, "&"&), “would 
prevent the United States from taking legitimate action in response to Canada’s pervasive subsidies for its 
softwood lumber industry”); Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Robert 
Lighthizer Statement on the WTO Panel Report in Canada’s Challenge to U.S. Countervailing Duties 
on Supercalendered Paper (July %, "&!#), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/"&!#/july/ustr-robert-lighthizer-statement-wto [https://perma.cc/XAB#-RBWY] (quoting 
Ambassador Lighthizer as saying that the “United States has long warned that the attack on our trade laws 
risks undermining the credibility of the WTO, and we again urge Members to consider the harm resulting 
from such rulings”). But the United States has not attacked the power conferred on the DSB by the DSU 
to mandate changes to WTO members’ laws and regulations. 
374 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) art. XIV, Apr. !', !$$(, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex !B, !#%$ U.N.T.S. !#* [hereinafter 
GATS]; see, e.g., General Agreement on Tari-s and Trade art. XX, Oct. *&, !$(), %! Stat. A-!!, '' 
U.N.T.S. !$( (permitting contracting parties to adopt and enforce measures to protect public morals 
and human health, among other state objectives). 
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(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement . . . .375 
 
The Appellate Body has explained that determining whether a given 
measure is necessary to achieve a public policy objective involves weighing 
the following factors: (!) the contribution of the measure to the public policy 
objective it pursues; (") the importance of the public policy objective; and (%) 
the degree to which the measure restricts trade.376 The .rst step of this 
analysis requires determining whether the measure genuinely contributes to 
a legitimate public policy objective.377 Assuming it does, and that the measure 
restricts trade, the second step requires determining whether there is a less 
trade-restrictive measure “reasonably available” that would achieve the 
respondent’s “desired level of protection” pursued under that public policy 
objective,378 a burden that falls on the complainant to establish.379 If the 
complainant establishes that there was a reasonably available alternative that 
achieved the same level of protection, then the measure was not “necessary” 
to pursue the legitimate public policy objective; if not, the necessity 
presumption stands.380 This formulation of the necessity defense makes 
sense, because it does not undermine the respondent’s right to pursue 
legitimate public policy objectives; it just requires the respondent to account 
for WTO obligations when it chooses the appropriate measure to achieve 
those public policy objectives. 
Similarly, an IIA between the European Union and the United States 
could have a general exceptions article explaining that a measure that is 
“necessary” to achieve a legitimate public policy objective excuses 
noncompliance with the IIA’s other substantive obligations. Instead of 
assessing whether the measure is trade restrictive, as is required for the 
necessity inquiry under the WTO agreements, the inquiry under the IIA 
could focus on whether the measure interferes with “the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
 
375 GATS, supra note *)(, art. XIV (emphasis added). 
376 E.g., Appellate Body Report, India—Certain Measures Related to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, ¶ '.'$, WTO Doc. WT/DS('%/AB/R (adopted Sept. !%, "&!%). 
377 E.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures A!ecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶¶ !(!-
(', WTO Doc. WT/DS**"/AB/R (adopted Dec. *, "&&)) (quoting Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Measures A!ecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ *&%, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS"#'/AB/R (adopted Apr. ), "&&')). 
378 E.g., United States—Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ *&# (emphasis added) (interpreting 
Article XIV of the GATS Agreement); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures 
A!ecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ !)*-)', WTO Doc. WT/DS!*'/AB/R (adopted 
Mar. !", "&&!) (interpreting Article XX(b) of the GATT !$$(). 
379 See, e.g., Brazil—Tyres, ¶ !'% (“It rests upon the complaining Member to identify possible 
alternatives to the measure at issue that the responding Member could have taken.”). 
380 Id. 
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disposition of investments.”381 In other words, it would focus on whether the 
measure was investment-restrictive, and whether there was a reasonably 
available, less investment-restrictive measure that could achieve the same 
public policy objective. Indeed, CETA Article "(.%." includes the basis for 
such an article in an E.U.-U.S. IIA. In relevant part, it provides that: 
For the purposes of . . . Sections B (Establishment of investments) and C 
(Non-discriminatory treatment) of Chapter Eight (Investment), subject to 
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti"able discrimination between the 
Parties where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in 
services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by a Party of measures necessary: 
(a) to protect public security or public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; [or] 
(c) to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement . . . .382 
 
This article does not go far enough, however, because it does not apply to 
all the host state’s investment obligations; instead, it applies only to the 
nondiscrimination obligations and the obligations with respect to the 
establishment of an investment.383 Under an E.U.-U.S. IIA, to ensure that a 
general exceptions article operated as a robust defense for host-state measures 
necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives, such an article should 
apply to all the host state’s substantive obligations—especially the FET 
standard. The IIA would also need to modify the chapeau language in CETA 
Article "(.%." to remove the proviso about arbitrary or unjusti.able 
discrimination, because the FET standard already protects investors against 
that treatment.384 In other words, if that proviso were to remain, a host state’s 
successful necessity defense against an FET claim could be overcome by a 
.nding that the state accorded the same arbitrary or discriminatory treatment 
that grounded the FET claim.385  
 
381 "&!" U.S. Model BIT, supra note "', arts. *-(. 
382 CETA, supra note !(, art. "#.*." (footnotes omitted). 
383 See LESTER & MERCURIO, supra note *"#, at !& (“It is rather odd, to say the least, that the 
EU +nds it necessary to include a general exception clause in relation to national treatment but not 
for other obligations such as expropriation and FET.”). 
384 See CETA, supra note !(, art. #.!&." (defining a breach of the obligation of fair and 
equitable treatment as including “manifest arbitrariness” and “targeted discrimination on 
manifestly wrongful grounds”). 
385 Cf. Barton Legum & Ioana Petculescu, GATT Article XX and International Investment Law, 
in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM 
*(&, *'' (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., "&!*) (“[I]t is di,cult to imagine a measure that 
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In summary, a general exceptions article should be included in an E.U.-
U.S. IIA because it would provide a concrete framework for determining when 
the host state’s pursuit of public policy objectives excuses its noncompliance 
with its other treaty obligations, such as the FET standard. Such a general 
exceptions article in an E.U.-U.S. IIA would obviate the need for states to 
resort to the argument that their measures deserve a margin of appreciation—
a proposition that has proven controversial in investor-state jurisprudence.386 
By contrast, merely including a general provision, such as CETA Article (.#.!, 
which provides that “the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their 
territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives,”387 imparts little guidance to 
tribunals on how they should resolve disputes when a host state breaches its 
substantive obligations in pursuit of a public policy objective. In other words, 
when CETA Articles (.#.! and (.!& (Treatment of Investors and of Covered 
Investments) conflict, which one prevails? In turn, a general exceptions article 
should create more ex ante certainty for states and investors about the types 
of host-state measures that will be excused, and, therefore, should preempt 
arguments that the IIA will cause “regulatory chill.” 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS COMMENT’S PROPOSAL 
This Comment’s proposed IIA between the United States and European 
Union represents a compromise between both parties’ current international 
investment agreement negotiating positions. Speci.cally, it merges aspects of 
the European Union’s Investment Court System with the United States’ ad 
hoc arbitration system implemented in the USMCA. The Comment also 
recommends building on the FET standard that the European Union has 
included in its recent IIAs. This Part focuses on four important implications 
that follow from the Comment’s proposal. 
First, the Comment implies that ICSID would establish an appellate 
mechanism and facilitate the creation of a separate appellate instrument into 
which states could opt. There are sound reasons to believe that it would: 
 
would be a violation of the FET standard and that would not also be viewed as arbitrary under [the 
chapeau of] GATT Article XX . . . .”). 
386 Compare Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/!&/) Award, 
¶ *$$ (July #, "&!%), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw)(!).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/#X*Q-ZNEM] (“The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent that the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is not limited to the context of the ECHR but ‘applies equally to claims arising under BITs,’ at 
least in contexts such as public health.”), with id., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Gary Born, ¶ #), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw)("#.pdf [https://perma.cc/"PAV-R"$D] (“I 
also do not believe that the ‘margin of appreciation’ adopted by the Tribunal is either mandated or permitted 
by the BIT or applicable international law. The ‘margin of appreciation’ . . . cannot properly be transplanted 
to the BIT (or to questions of fair and equitable treatment more generally).”). 
387 CETA, supra note !(, art. #.$.!. 
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ICSID has proven to be a reliable supporter of ISDS reform e,orts388 and 
would likely embrace a role that promoted its own continued relevance in the 
international investment law regime. Moreover, the creation of an opt-in 
appellate mechanism at ICSID would not prejudice its ability to administer 
ad hoc arbitrations.389 
Second, by proposing the preservation of ad hoc arbitration in the .rst 
instance, the Comment implies that the European Union would relax its 
commitment to a .rst-instance Investment Court System model—
speci.cally, by abandoning a standing tribunal and by allowing investors to 
appoint arbitrators. As explained in subsection II.B.!, most of the features 
that de.ne investor-state arbitration under the .rst tier of the European 
Union’s Investment Court System resemble the features of ad hoc arbitration 
that the United States incorporated in the USMCA, suggesting that the 
European Union might accept the U.S. version of ad hoc arbitration. The 
more challenging issue: convincing the European Union that the IIA should 
permit each party to an arbitration—that is, the investor and the state—to 
appoint an arbitrator, as the European Union has argued that preventing 
investors from appointing arbitrators is necessary to enhance international 
investment law’s legitimacy.390 The counterargument to this position, which 
has been developed throughout this Comment, is that enabling investors to 
appoint arbitrators is necessary to ensure a neutral forum in which investor-
state disputes can be resolved. 
Third, this Comment’s proposal would not upend current investor-state 
arbitration practice. The .eld’s most skilled arbitrators would be eligible to 
serve on the appellate mechanism’s roster of appellate adjudicators, provided 
they complied with con/ict-of-interest rules enshrined in the IIA, which 
 
388 For example, ICSID and UNCITRAL Working Group III collaborated to produce draft a 
Code of Conduct for Adjudicators. See ICSID and UNCITRAL Release Draft Code of Conduct for 
Adjudicators, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS. (May !, "&"&), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/news-and-events/news-releases/icsid-and-uncitral-release-draft-code-
conduct-adjudicators [https://perma.cc/$%LA-QWX)] (“The draft Code was developed jointly by 
the ICSID and UNCITRAL Secretariats in the context of the work of UNCITRAL Working Group 
III (ISDS reform) and the process underway to amend ICSID’s rules of procedure.”). 
389 To be sure, ICSID would need to add more staff to support an appeals mechanism. In this 
vein, it could draw on the WTO Secretariat’s separation of its dispute settlement-support services into 
a Legal Affairs Division that supports dispute settlement panels and an Appellate Body Secretariat that 
supports the Appellate Body. See Divisions, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm [https://perma.cc/'R*)-T$W'] (explaining that the Legal Affairs 
Division “provide[s] legal advice and information to WTO dispute settlement panels, other WTO 
bodies, WTO members and the WTO Secretariat” and that the Appellate Body Secretariat “provides 
legal and administrative support to the Appellate Body”). 
390 See EUR. COMM’N, supra note !"), at ( (“The installation of a permanent investment court 
system means that the parties can no longer choose their own arbitrators. This fundamentally 
corrects the economic incentives at play.”). 
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would mirror those in CETA and the USMCA. This model departs from the 
European Union’s vision for a Multilateral Investment Court, whose 
adjudicators would be restricted to arbitrating disputes in that court 
system.391 In short, allowing adjudicators who complied with stringent 
con/ict-of-interest rules to serve on the roster of appellate adjudicators and 
continue arbitrating other cases would likely attract the highest quality 
adjudicators—especially given that adjudicators on the appellate roster would 
have no guarantee of being selected to hear appeals.392 
Fourth, the United States might resist this Comment’s proposal to include 
a version of the FET standard in the E.U.-U.S. IIA that resembles the 
version the European Union included in CETA. The United States has 
endorsed tying fair and equitable treatment to the minimum standard of 
treatment under customary international law since at least "&&!, when it, 
Canada, and Mexico issued the Joint Interpretive Note.393 And it has wired 
the customary international law version of fair and equitable treatment into 
the U.S. Model BIT. That said, the closed list of circumstances constituting 
a FET breach under CETA incorporates the types of state behavior that 
tribunals have found to breach the minimum standard under NAFTA,394 
suggesting that there is not as much distance between the two parties’ current 
formulation of the standard as there may appear. Thus, there are strong 
reasons to believe that the United States would accept the incorporation of 
the European Union’s formulation of the FET standard in an E.U.-U.S. IIA. 
In turn, the adoption of the European Union’s proposed FET language should 
promote more predictability in the resolution of investment disputes, thereby 
establishing the E.U.-U.S. IIA as an attractive model for other countries to 
draw on in negotiating their own IIAs. 
CONCLUSION 
The European Union and United States have a unique window of 
opportunity to reassert the legitimacy of international investment law and to 
 
391 See European Union, Possible Reform, supra note '%, ¶ !% (“Adjudicators would be 
employed full-time. They would not have any outside activities.”). 
392 Cf. GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & MICHELE POTESTÀ, THE COMPOSITION OF A 
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT COURT AND OF AN APPEAL MECHANISM FOR INVESTMENT 
AWARDS ¶ $) ("&!)) (reasoning that, under a roster-based appellate mechanism, “room would have 
to be made for the adjudicators’ external activities, as a member of the roster would have no 
assurance of ever being appointed to a panel”). 
393 See supra note !'" and accompanying text. 
394 See DUMBERRY, supra note *(&, at !&( (“[W]hat is probably the most striking feature of 
Article #.!& CETA is the undeniable fact that the +nal list of elements it contains (and their actual 
contours) is to a very large extent based on how NAFTA tribunals have interpreted Article !!&' 
[NAFTA’s minimum standard] over the last "& years.”). 
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strengthen their own bilateral investment relationship in the process. The 
United States and the European Union must act on this issue now; if they punt, 
a polarized international investment law regime may follow, with the European 
Union’s Investment Court System on the one hand and ad hoc arbitration or 
no ISDS mechanism on the other hand. Such a scenario would do little to 
promote the stability and predictability of FDI, which is a principal objective 
of international investment law and a driver of global growth. 
This Comment proposed a structure for avoiding that scenario: the 
negotiation of an investment chapter that (!) creates a two-tiered ISDS system 
with an appellate mechanism and (") harmonizes key substantive investment 
protection provisions. The proposed dispute resolution structure should satisfy 
the European Union and the United States, because an ICSID-based appeals 
mechanism would improve the correctness of ISDS awards and add 
institutional legitimacy to ISDS. Similarly, the harmonization of substantive 
provisions it has proposed should appeal to both parties, as it would generate 
more ex ante certainty for investors and states about the types of host-state 
measures that would breach substantive obligations and provide a coherent 
framework for determining when public policy measures excuse noncompliance 
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